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Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities of
Artificial Beings and Legal Fictions
In the aftermath of one of the most highly publicized trials in product lia-
bility annals-the celebrated Pinto case-the legal question raised by that
litigation remains unresolved. Controversy continues as to whether a cor-
poration should be convicted of homicide when it knowingly markets an
unsafe product that results in death. Today the answer is a resounding
"no", in light of state statutes defining homicide as the killing of one
human being by another, difficulties in finding the requisite criminal in-
tent; and the practical problems of placing a legal fiction behind bars.
However, there are recent indications that these present obstacles to a cor-
porate homicide conviction appear to be dissolving.
The author explores the theories of corporate criminal liability as they
relate to homicide and examines the attitudes and policies upon which
those theories are predicated. Finally, the author examines legislative pro-
posals which attempt to expand present liability schemes aimed at deter-
ring individual acts of reckless disregard for human life to include similar
acts inflicted by the corporate body.
I. PROLOGUE
Copp: The attitude was no different in the Ford Motor Company about
the Pinto than it was in any other Detroit company. It was basi-
cally to get the car on the road, to do it at a minimum cost to
meet only those regulations extant or in effect.
Wallace: Even if it was not as safe as you would like it to be?
Copp: Exactly. The Pinto was sold as a 2,000 pound car that would
cost $2,000. And that objective was going to be met come hell or
high water. 1
The objective was met and Ford Motor Company proceeded to
sell some one and a half million Pintos, vintage 1971-1976, know-
ing that its gas tank posed a dangerous risk of fuel leakage and
explosion. 2 The company made no attempt to fix or redesign the
gas tank, nor to warn its customers of the hazards until forced to
1. Interview of Harley Copp, a retired Ford executive, by Mike Wallace as
broadcast over the CBS Television Network on "Is your Car Safe"? 10 60 MINUTES,
June 11, 1978, No. 40, at 5 [hereinafter cited as 60 MINUTES] (unpublished tran-
script provided by Columbia Broadcasting System.) This testimony by Mr. Copp
arising out of the interview with 60 MINUTES is not to be confused with, nor reflect
upon any of the testimony elicited during trial. The statements were given prior to
the Pinto trial in Indiana and were not subject to cross examination nor to the
strict rules of legal evidence.
2. Pasztor, Ford Loses on Potentially Crucial Point in Pinto Suit but Wins
Technical Rulings, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
do so by the federal government.3 The results were tragic.
Within milliseconds, a van smashed into the back of a 1973 Ford
Pinto traveling 4 on U.S. 33 toward Goshen, Indiana.5 The gas tank
impacted against the differential, ripping it open on four protrud-
ing bolts; gasoline splashed into the passenger compartment, ig-
niting and engulfing the interior of the car in flames. The two
girls trapped inside the Pinto were incinerated; a third girl par-
tially thrown from the vehicle, received burns over ninety percent
of her body and died six hours later.6
Elkhart County prosecutor Michael Cosentino brought Ford
Motor Company to trial on three reckless homicide charges; 7 he
claimed the three girls died as a result of a high-level corporate
decision to risk human life for greater company profit.8 Because
an appropriate civil remedy did not exist,9 the county prosecutor
3. Id. A tally by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration
showed that by May 1978, over 29 civil cases had been filed against Ford in connec-
tion with the Pinto fuel system. As of November of 1979, 23 people had lost their
lives in Pinto infernos following rear-end collisions. 125 CONG. REC. E5,658 (daily
ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
4. A dispute arose at trial as to whether the car was actually "traveling," or
moving during impact. Both hospital orderly Levi Woodard and supervisor Nancy
Fogo claimed to have spoken with one of the three teenage accident victims, Judy
Ulrich, prior to her death when she was wheeled into the Elkhart General Hospital
emergency room the night of the crash. During that unusual deathbed conversa-
tion, Ms. Ulrich claimed she had stopped her car immediately before collision to
retrieve her gas cap that had fallen off after a service station fill-up. Tybor, How
Ford Won Pinto Trial, NAT'L L.J., March 24, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
5. Taybor, The Pinto Prosecutor, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 10, col. 1.
6. Id. at col. 2. Pathologists stated that the three young girls would have
walked away from the crash if not for the fire, indicating the impact was not great
enough, on its own, to cause serious injury or death. Is Ford Guilty of Homicide?
Pinto case ready for jury, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD, March 9, 1980, at 14A, col. 1.
A similar accident occurred in May of 1972 on Interstate 15 outside San Bernar-
dino, California. The Pinto, in which 13-year old Richard Grimshaw was riding,
stalled and was rear-ended by another car traveling at 35 miles per hour. The gas
tank ignited, incinerating the driver of the Pinto so badly, she died of her burns
three days later. Passenger Richard Grimshaw barely survived. His burns were
abhorently massive, covering 95 percent of his body, taking four fingers, a nose, a
left ear and requiring 65 major surgeries. 60 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 2; see also
K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.2, at 7 (1980). Out of the case arising from the
accident came the largest individual award of punitive damages in jurisprudential
history-$125 million--granted by an Orange County jury, largely in reaction to
proof that Ford knew the Pinto's gas tank was likely to rupture in a collision re-
gardless of the speed of the cars involved. The award was later remitted to $6.3
million. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761 (Orange County Super. Ct., filed
Nov. 22, 1972). As of this writing the case is docketed for appeal in the Court of
Appeal Fourth Appellate District in San Bernardino, No. 4th Civil 20095.
7. A fourth count of criminal recklessness was later dropped at the request of
the prosecutors.
8. 60 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 2; see also Pasztor, supra note 2, at 2, col. 3;
Tybor, Pinto Issue: Can a Corporation Kill?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 25, 1978, at 5, col. 3.
9. Comment, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-
Making, 54 NOTRE DAME L. 911, 923 & n.95 (1979).
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was forced to bring the case on a new and unchallenged Indiana
statute permitting criminal prosecution of a corporation,lO and in
doing so, he took a pioneering step in products liability." Previ-
ously, corporations faced criminal sanctions in antitrust, environ-
mental, and securities laws, but never before have manufacturers
been criminally indicted for the reckless design of their prod-
ucts.12
Indiana's Pinto Case 13 raised for the first time in a legal setting
the fascinating issue of whether or not a corporation is capable of
committing homicide through the reckless design of its products.
It was Ford's contention that the legislature did not intend to
charge reckless homicide to a corporation. 14 Instead, they argued
the statutes were intended only to prevent people from killing
other people .5 The prosecutor found fault with Ford's analysis,
stating that it "patently exploits the corporate fiction."1 6 The
state also noted that while it "does not desire to chill manufactur-
ing generally, it does desire to deter outrageous decisions to sacri-
fice human life for private profit.' 17
Although one of the most bitter18 and highly publicized trials in
product liability history, its ultimate precedential value remains
in conflict19-the victim of a judicial stalemate. For the first time,
10. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-3 (Burns 1979) reads in part:
(a) A Corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association may be
prosecuted for any offense; it may be convicted of an offense only if it is
proved that the offense was committed by its agent acting within the
scope of his authority.
The recent origin of this statute, while providing the prosecutor with a cause of
action, also proved critical to the eventual outcome of the case. Included in the
jury instructions was the proviso that even if the jury found that the automobile
was designed with reckless disregard for human life, they would also have to find
that Ford failed to warn of the danger after July 1, 1978, in order to convict. That
was the date the Indiana law permitting criminal prosecution for reckless homi-
cide of corporations went into effect. Tybor, supra note 4, at 12, col. 2.
11. Tybor, supra note 5, at 10, col. 1.
12. Bodine, Prosecutors Undeterred by Pinto Acquittal; Defense Bar Says It's
in Driver's Seat Now, NAT'L L.J., March 31, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
13. State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indiana Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978).
14. Tybor, supra note 8, at 5, col. 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at cols. 2-3.
18. For an interesting discussion of the bitter feud which developed and an in-
sight into the contrasting personalities of prosecutor Michael Cosentino and de-
fense attorney James Neal, see Tybor, supra note 4, at 1.
19. Lucas County Prosecutor Anthony Pizza has fied a three-count claim in
Toledo, Ohio, charging Conrail with aggravated vehicular homicide in the deaths
a court of law has ruled that a corporation can be indicted for the
reckless design of a product, opening the door to new theories of
corporate liability. Whether this fact is construed as achievement
or legal extremism, it is counteracted by the additional fact that
Ford Motor Company today stands acquitted of all criminal
charges 2 O-hence the stalemate.
This is not to say that the same marketing decision by Ford that
resulted in acquittal on criminal charges in Indiana was not
found to be culpable under civil liability theories elsewhere. In-
deed, the factual allegations in Indiana were hauntingly similar to
those raised in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,21 where the jury
found Ford's disregard of human life so blatant as to justify the
original $125 million punitive damage award.
The automobile industry is open to the charge that the pursuit
of profits often conflicts with social and moral responsibilities,
that shareholder interests can and do preclude humanitarian ad-
vancements, 22 and what is best for America is not always what is
best for business. Yet despite these conflicting goals, efforts to
of three teenagers whose car collided with a speeding train. Mr. Pizza is confident
in spite of Ford's recent victory in the Pinto case. "The verdict didn't say corpora-
tions are immune from prosecution. It just said that in that fact situation, the
company wasn't guilty." Bodine, Prosecutors Undeterred by Pinto Acquittal; De-
fense Bar Says It's in Driver's Seat Now, NAT'L L.J., March 31, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
20. Perhaps of greater interest than the eventual outcome of the trial was the
great evidentiary battle that transpired. The presiding judge would not admit
prosecution documents on crash tests that did not pertain directly to the 1973
Pinto, which was the model involved in the accident, even though the 1971-76
models were virtually identical. The ruling precluded the prosecutor from admit-
ting all but 20 of the more than 300 documents into evidence which he contended
showed a pattern dating back to 1967 by Ford to cover up the allegedly defective
fuel tank design. Tybor, supra note 4, at 13, col. 1. One of the excluded documents
was a Ford memo which allegedly weighed the costs of fixing the fuel tank against
paying damages for burn deaths and injuries for civil cases. Is Ford guilty of
Homicide? Pinto case ready for jury, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD, March 9, 1980, at
14A, col. 13.
Defense attorneys also voiced complaints of the evidentiary rulings, most partic-
ularly that many adverse rulings were made with the judge neither listening to
nor reading the evidence. Tybor, supra note 4, at 13, col. 4.
21. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761 (Orange County Super. Ct., filed
Nov. 22, 1972). Both accidents involved a Ford Pinto that was designed with the
fuel tank located behind the rear axel close to protruding bolts and brackets.
Upon rear-end impact, the gas tanks of both Pintos were punctured by a bolt on
the differential, allowing fuel to spill into the passenger compartment and burst
into flames. 60 MINUTES, supra, note 1, at 3-4.
22. The landmark decision of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W.
668 (1919), has turned out to be one of the chief bones to stick in the consumer
movement's throat. In 1916, Ford Motor Company had its best year ever; it looked
forward to a $60 million profit. Henry Ford, president, chairman of the board, and
58 percent shareholder, announced that no stock dividends were to be paid. In-
stead he planned an expansion program of $11.3 million, and he had determined to
dedicate the company more to the welfare of the population by providing more
jobs and lowering the selling price of the cars, making them available to more peo-
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mold socially acceptable behavior in the free enterprise system
normally have presented few problems under current liability
theories. Actions such as Ford's, which involve conscious disre-
gard for human life,23 represent a form of corporate wrongdoing
that is insufficiently deterred by present schemes of liability.
Thus, it will be the purpose of this article to focus on an entirely
unique concept in products liability: the charge of criminal corpo-
rate endangerment and, where death ensues, corporate homicide.
The initial sections of this article will critically assess particular
industries and particular companies in an attempt to set the stage
for the discussion which follows. That discussion is premised on
a conclusion that the problem addressed here is significant and
thus merits the attention of legal scholars. Therefore, while the
criticism in these sections may at times appear harsh, it is not
meant as a legal indictment, nor is it directed solely at the refer-
enced industries or companies. With this preface in mind, the in-
quiry will examine: (1) high-level company decisions that
knowingly risked and took human life; (2) the attitudes responsi-
ble for corporate exemption from criminal sanctions in the prod-
uct liability field; (3) a discussion of current theories of corporate
accountability; (4) conceptual and practical problems with ex-
panding corporate criminal liability; and (5) legislative proposals
which address this type of knowing corporate endangerment of
both employees and consumers in the product field.
II. CORPORATE DECISIONMAKING
Large business firms have been creators of wealth and jobs, a
major reason why our real per capita income has tripled in the
ple. The minority shareholders brought an action to compel a dividend. In finding
in favor of the minority stockholders, the court stated:
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties
which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general
public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to pro-
testing, minority stockholders. A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profits of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to
be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not ex-
tend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.
Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
23. As determined by the Orange County jury in Grimshaw. Note 6 supra.
past 40 years.24 Additionally, corporate philanthropy totals some
one billion dollars annually or six percent of all philanthropic
projects in the country. 25
Yet, those same firms have also been the creators of widows
and widowers. While millions of Americans bolt their doors at
night as protection against known dangers which lurk outside,
they unwittingly submit themselves to the perils of unsafe prod-
ucts, a frequent source of injury and death.26 Of chief concern are
those manufacturers who are aware, yet choose to keep silent
concerning dangers with the products we use.27
A. The Pinto Cases
Ford Motor Company made a decision to place on the market a
car whose gas tank design was fully expected to injure and kill a
substantial number of people.2 8 The charge is supported by evi-
dence, 29 much of which comes from Ford's own company docu-
24. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SEI4GMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 32
(1976).
25. Id.
26. It has been estimated by one source that each year consumer products
create 30,000 deaths and 20 million serious injuries. Schrager & Short, How Seri-
ous a Crime? in WHITE-CoLLAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH, 16 (G. Geis & E.
Stotland eds. 1980).
27. Corporate knowledge of its own misconduct is not limited to the realm of
product safety. "For some period of time Jones & Laughlin's Cleveland steel plant
was well aware of the money it saved in effluent treatment costs while still avoid-
ing fines under the Rivers and Harbors Act, by systematically dumping its efflu-
ents into the Cuyahoga River in the dead of night." Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich,
Conscience of a Steelworker, THE NATION, Sept. 27, 1971, at 268.
In 1974, energy companies told the public there were emergency shortages of
heating oil and gasoline, and fuel prices soared; then as congressional investiga-
tions revealed that oil companies had actually cut back refinery production, the
companies reported they had boosted their profits by as much as 83% (Shell) and
a phenonmenal 174% (Pennzoil) during the first nine months of 1974. Zwerdling,
The Food Monopolies, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1975, at 13-14.
For an example of the extent to which evidence can be suppressed and distorted
to result in the endangerment of numerous prescription drug patients, see the
case of Toole v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967).
28. To be exact, Ford designers anticipated 180 burn deaths and 180 serious
burn injuries. 60 MImrrEs, supra note 1, at 6.
Business welfare in the eyes of the businessmen have on other occasions super-
seded public safety. Ralph Waldo Emerson recounted an attempt to build a light-
house to protect ships and sailors from destruction along the rocky coastline:
"Went to Nauset Light on the backside of Cape Cod. Collins, the keeper, told us
he found obstinate resistence to the project of building a lighthouse on this coast,
as it would injure the wrecking business." Mintz & Cohen, Crime in the Suites, in
THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AccOuNTABnrrY 73, 73 (R. Nader ed. 1973).
29. Part of the evidence stems from the testimony of Harley Copp, a former
Ford executive who stated that at a meeting on April 22, 1971, Ford executives re-
jected a plan to spend $6.65 per car to modify the Pinto designed for 1973 produc-
tion. He said it was rejected for "cost and the effect it would have on profitability."
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ments. One of those documents, the Grush-Saunby Report, 30 was
prepared for the company in its efforts to lobby the federal gov-
ernment to reduce its fuel tank standards. The heart of that docu-
ment reveals a typical cost-benefit analysis, which resulted in a
company decision not to redesign the Pinto gas tank, despite hav-
ing the technology to do so. 31 On June 11, 1978, 60 Minutes was
televised with an interview between Mike Wallace and one of the
plaintiff's attorneys from the case of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Company,32 Arthur Hews:
Wallace: Table three is the heart of this document.
Hews: That's right.
Wallace: And it says, "Benefits: savings of 180 burn deaths, 180 serious
burn injuries, and 2100 burned vehicles-at a total cost of $49.5
million." What does this mean, "savings", "benefit"?
Hews: All right. The first thing that they are measuring is the value of
human lives. They are taking 180 lives and they figure that a
human being's life is worth $200,000. So they multiply that out.
They then-they-they take 180 serious burns, such as Richard
Grimshaw, and they figure that's only worth $67,000-and they
multiply that out. And they come out and they say that-that
that's worth $49.5 million. They're using numbers to place value
on life and burn.
Wallace: All right.
Hews: They then turn around and say it's going to cost us eleven
dollars a car to save these 180 lives and to save these 180 burns.
Wallace: And they would come to a total cost of $137 million?
Hews: Yes.
Wallace: And what you're saying is that the Ford Motor Company said
they did not want to spend $137 million in order to get a mere
$50 million benefit?
Hews: That's correct. 3 3
Former executive for Ford critical of Pinto fuel system, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD,
Feb. 8, 1980, at 13A, col. 1.
30. The Grush-Saunby report contains Ford memos, crash tests, reports and
financial studies and is thus a very "hot" item not easily obtained. The Chicago
Tribune was fortunate enough to receive photocopies of the documents prior to is-
suance of a protective order against their distribution and since then the Tribune
has received several offers to buy them. One of the more noteworthy offers was
one of $5,000 for a single document. Strobel & Tybor, Pinto Papers Hold Key to
Ford Trial, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 10, col. 2.
31. Ford Motor Company could not effectively use a "state of the art" defense
by arguing that current technology was incapable of designing a safer fuel tank lo-
cation. Ford had been selling its German import, the Ford Fiesta, during the same
period as the Pinto, with its fuel tank in a safer position-forward of the rear axle.
The European version of the Fiesta brochure even highlighted the safety feature
as a selling point: "Fuel tank located forward of rear axle to avoid spillage in the
event of a collision." 60 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 8.
32. Attorney Mark Robinson Jr., of the Arthur Hews law firm was the main
figure for the plaintiff in the Grimshaw case.
33. 60 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 6. Ford's contention on the Grush-Saunby re-
Another internal company report, dated April 1971, discussed
the added design costs of installing a protective shield between
the gas tank and the rear axle. 34 Noting a four dollar per vehicle
design cost, the report recommended deferring installation of the
protective shield or "flak suit" for two years to reduce overall de-
sign costs. "Defer adoption of the 'flak' suit or bladder on all af-
fected cars until 1976 to realize a design cost savings of $20.9
million.... Continue with engineering testing and development
to assure that final design approaches can be continued with
minimum financial impact."35
Complementing the numerous written documents were films 3 6
of crash tests conducted by Ford on the Pinto showing that fuel
escaped in collisions of low to moderate speeds.37 The car was
tested on five separate occasions3 8 by running it into a stationary
barrier at speeds of around nineteen and a half miles per hour.3 9
The Pinto leaked gas on all five occasions.40 Ford put the car into
production, knowing that it had never passed a fuel tank test.4 1
The action was one alleged to be a purposeful and reckless disre-
gard of human life for the sake of company profit margins.42
B. Asbestos Litigation43
Ford Motor Company is not alone." Dozens of asbestos manu-
port is that the figures were not set by Ford, but by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. Herbert Misch, vice president of environmental and safety
engineering at Ford Motor Company had this to say about Table 3 of the report.
We would never put a number on the cost of life of an individual, and we
never have. And we were responding in a-in an appropriate way in the
normal rule-making process. It's been taken totally out of context, and
people have been led to believe that the Ford Motor Company is so cal-
lous that we wouldn't spend eleven dollars to save that many lives, and
it's an untruth.
Id. at 7.
34. Kirsch, Auto Fuel Tank Fires: Pre-discovery Techniques, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J.
271, 311 (1979).
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
36. Id.
37. Tybor, supra note 5, at 11, col. 2.
38. K. REDDEN, supra note 6, § 1.1, at 10 (1980).
39. 60 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 3.
40. K. Redden, supra note 6, § 1.1, at 10.
41. Id.; see also 60 MImrrs, supra note 1, at 3.
42. 60 MI.NrrEs, supra note 1, at 5.
43. Asbestos litigation presents special problems with damage award
limitations under workmen's compensation theories which will not be addressed
by this article. This section will illustrate the conscious disregard for human life
that may be future grounds for criminal indictment.
44. Also included are officials at Occidental Chemical Company who, for years
had allegedly deliberately misled California officials by withholding evidence that
illegal waste-dumping at their Lathrop, California pesticide plant was poisoning lo-
cal drinking water. Dating back to 1975, officials conceeded that laws had been
broken when pesticides were secretly dumped by the plant into nearby waste
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facturers stand close to Ford's side. In cities and towns across the
country, wherever there is a shipyard, an asbestos plant, or peo-
ple who work as contract insulators on construction jobs, the as-
bestos war is waging. It is one of the most massive onslaughts of
product litigation ever to hit this nation.45
More than 3,000 cases had been filed as of 197946 by plant and
shipyard workers, insulators, and "bystanders." 47 Their diseases
are as diverse as their exposure levels, including asbestosis,
bronchogenic cancer, certain gastrointestinal cancers, and
mesothelioma. Each disease can have latency periods of ten to
thirty-five years.4 8
The cases acquire great significance because the companies had
learned of the asbestos danger decades prior 49 to any warning re-
leased to the exposed workers. Yet they had chosen to keep the
ponds, which contaminated neighborhood drinking wells. After estimating that his
company dumped five tons of pesticides a year into the ground, Edson wrote, in a
June 25, 1976 memo that "no outsiders actually know what we do and there has
been no government pressure on us, so we have held back trying to find out what
to do within funds we have available." Hume, Firm Poisoned Wells with Waste,
Kept State in Dark, LA. TIMES, June 19, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
An engineering director at General Dynamics sent the following memorandum
to his superior a few years ago: "It seems to me inevitable that, in the 20 years
ahead of us, DC-10 cargo doors will come open and cargo compartments will expe-
rience decompression for other reasons and I expect this to usually result in loss
of the airplane." He added that floor changes would be costly, but "may well be
less expensive than the cost of damages resulting from the loss of one plane-load
of people." The advice was sadly ignored and on March 3, 1974, a Turkish Airlines
DC-10 crashed nine minutes after taking off from Paris after its cargo door blew
open, killing 346 passengers. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE Gi-
ANT CORPORATION 26 (1976).
45. Bruck, The Armies of Asbestos, Am. LAW., Nov. 1979, at 19, col. 4.
46. In calculating "first generation" claimants, people directly exposed to as-
bestos in a workplace, it is projected that about 1,300 new actions a year for the
next 10 years will arise. Ronald Motley, a law partner in the South Carolina firm
of Blatt & Fales, who has 600 of the cases himself, figures there may be three mil-
lion potential asbestos plaintiffs from the 8 to 11 million American workers who
have been exposed to asbestos since World War H. Id. at 20, col. 1.
47. The term includes wives who washed out asbestos dust-laden clothing,
people who lived near plants, and even secretaries in asbestos companies. Id.
48. Id. Asbestos fibers which come to rest in the lungs, are virtually inde-
structible and are said to have a half life of infinity.
49. Evidence of earlier knowledge by others stems even further back. In a
publication of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, it is noted
that in 1918, the practice of American and Canadian insurance companies was not
to insure asbestos workers due to the assumed injurious health condition of that
industry. Hearings on Asbestos - Related Occupational Diseases Before the Sub-
comm. on Compensation, Health & Safety of the House Comm. on Education & La-
bor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978) (statement of George W. Kilbourne)
[hereinafter cited as Health & Sqety Hearings].
information to themselves to avoid anticipated business losses.5 0
As with Ford, evidence of prior knowledge is substantial.
In the 1930's and 1940's, the asbestos industry spent thousands
of dollars to research the health effects of asbestos on its workers.
When the results pointed to potentially fatal effects, high-level ex-
ecutives of major asbestos firms prevented the researchers from
publishing the adverse findings. 1 One of those firms was Johns-
Manville.
In 1934, a medical report funded by Johns-Manville was com-
pleted by a Dr. Lanza. After seeing the medical report, Vandiver
Brown, a Johns-Manville general counsel in the mid-1930's, wrote
a letter to Dr. Lanza urging that "[aill we ask is that all of the
favorable aspects of the survey be included and that none of the
unfavorable be unintentionally pictured in darker tones than the
comments justify. I feel confident we can depend upon you and
Dr. McConnell to give us this 'break .... 5
Disregard of worker safety for the betterment of the company
extended all the way to the office of company presidents. Internal
documents known as the "Sumner Simpson file" were obtained
by plaintiff attorneys in a deposition from Raybestos-Manhat-
tan.5 3 The file contained letters between Simpson, the president
of Raybestos, and Vandiver Brown. In those letters, the men dis-
cussed the need to control the publicity about asbestos-related
disease in the trade journals. "I think the less said about asbes-
tos, the better off we are," Simpson wrote Brown. "I quite agree
with you," Brown replied, "that our interests are best served by
having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity."5 4
Regarding the Asbestos Magazine funded by the industry, Sum-
ner Simpson wrote, "[Oif course, we understand that all this in-
formation on asbestos is to be kept confidential and that nothing
should be published about asbestos in Asbestos Magazine at
present."5 5 In 1936, Simpson wrote, that "[y] ou want to stress the
fact that we do not want them [medical reportsl given to shyster
lawyers and doctors so as to be the subject of suits for, as you
know, we have had enough adjustments for one company."56
Through all this secrecy and suppression of information, the em-
50. Id. at 67.
51. Asbestos and its Lessons, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1979, at 9.
52. Health & Safety Hearings, supra note 49, at 54 (statement of Kenneth W.
Carlson).
53. Bruck, The Armies of Asbestos, Am. LAw, Nov. 1979, at 21, col. 2.
54. Id. The date of that discussion was Oct. 1, 1935. See also 125 Cong. Rec.
E5657 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
55. Health & Safety Hearings, supra note 49, at 54 (statement of Kenneth W.
Carlson).
56. Id.
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ployees were never informed of the risks until much later.5 7
Lawyers for Johns-Manville claimed that the company knew
that plant workers were risking asbestosis in the 1930's and thus,
tried to hold down dust levels in the plants. The company, how-
ever, did not know that insulation workers were similarly endan-
gered until 1964, when the company began issuing warnings to the
workers. Yet even those industrial claims of innocence were dis-
proved by documents discovered last May by two lawyers in an
abandoned tool shed at the Saranac Laboratory in Saranac Lake,
New York.58 The documents report a study done in the mid-1940's
by Saranac, which was commissioned by Owens-Illinois, another
asbestos manufacturer, to find out whether or not the product
Kaylo, containing about 15 percent asbestos, would pose any haz-
ard to workers making it or to insulation workers using it. The
Kaylo documents specifically addressed the question of hazard to
insulation workers which the Johns-Manville lawyers claimed
there was no knowledge of until 1964. The papers revealed that as
early as 1948, Owens-Illinois received a report saying that "Kaylo
... is capable of producing asbestosis and should be handled as a
hazardous industrial dust."59
Placed in perspective, the problem was not that asbestos expo-
sure was potentially lethal, rather, the problem was prior knowl-
edge by the company of the dangers coupled with company
efforts aimed at suppres.sing such information from the public and
their own employees.60 In 1943, Dr. Hueper, who was active in the
medical research conducted by asbestos companies addressed the
issue of publicity.
Industrial concerns are in general not particularly anxious to have the oc-
currence of occupational cancers among their employees or of environ-
57. A list of warning dates were included in the Health & Safety Hearings,
supra note 49, at 56. Of continuing doubt however, is the extent and adequacy of
those warnings. These warning dates and the corporations issuing them are as fol-
lows:
Johns-Mansville ................. 1964 Celotex, previously
Eagle-Picher ................. May 1964 Phillip Carey .............. Oct. 1971
Owens-Corning ................. 1964 Amatex ..................... June 1972
Fiberboard ...................... 1966 Raybestos-Manhattan ........ July 1972
Pittsburg Corning ........... Nov. 1968 H.K. Porter .................. July 1972
Keene Corporation .............. 1969
58. Bruck, The Armies of Asbestos, Am. LAW. Nov. 1979, at 21, col. 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 21, col. 2.
mental cancers among the consumers of their products made a matter of
public records. Such publicity might reflect unfavorably upon their busi-
ness activities and oblige them to undertake extensive and expensive
technical and sanitary changes in their production methods and in the
types of products manufactured. There is, moreover, the distinct possibil-
ity of becoming involved in compensation suits with extravagant financial
claims by the injured parties.6 1
Resulting lawsuits aimed at the asbestos manufacturers have,
to date, been confined to the civil arena. A case of early note was
Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Products Corporation,62 the first major
victory for an asbestos insulation worker afflicted with asbestosis
and mesothelioma. Borel, who died of these diseases before the
case reached trial, sought to hold the defendants liable on four li-
ability theories: negligence, gross negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability. 63
Liability theories in the more recent case of Yandle v. PRG In-
dustries Inc. ,64 were quite similar to those brought in Borel. Both
negligence and strict liability were alleged for the failure to warn
the employees of the danger in asbestos exposure. Exemplary
damages, under the state workmen's compensation laws, were
sought for the beneficiaries of deceased employees who died as a
result of the asbestos exposure.65 The case was settled out of
court for twenty million dollars. 66
Damage awards have been even greater in more recent deci-
sions; however, for reasons to be discussed later, civil liability the-
ories and their resulting fines are not designed to deter this
particular type of wrongdoing.67 Absent criminal liability, these
actions will likely recur.68
Today it is public knowledge that the Ford Motor Company
61. Health & Safety Hearings, supra note 49, at 55 (statement of Kenneth W.
Carlson).
62. 493 F.2d 1076 (1973). The case is of landmark status, considered by some to
be "the Bible" of asbestos litigation.
63. Id. at 1086.
64. 65 F.R.D. 566 (1974).
65. The case originally sought $100 million in damages for 445 workers, but the
class action attempt was denied and the case was settled out of court for $20 mil-
lion in late 1977. Bruck, supra note 58, at 20, col. 4.
66. Id.
67. See notes 28-61 and accompanying text supra as well as the discussion of
punitive damages in the text accompanying notes 126-67 infra.
68. This conclusion is based upon the stigma businessmen associate with a
criminal conviction and the fear which arises where there is the strong possibility
of imprisonment. See text accompanying notes 288-91 infra.
"Businessmen abhor the idea of being branded a criminal." Ball & Friedman, The
Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Socio-
logical View, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 197, at 217 (1965). Moreover, "[t] he very fact that a
criminal statute has been enacted by the legislature is a powerful factor in making
the proscribed conduct illegitimate in the eyes of a potential actor, even when the
actor disagrees with the purpose of the law." Id.
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knew that an eleven dollar shield around the gas tank would stop
Pintos from exploding when struck by another car from the rear,
thus saving 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn injuries. 69 We
know today that leading asbestos firms withheld the health
hazards of their product for nearly thirty years to avert expensive
production changes.7 0 As a result, it is estimated that 300,000
American asbestos workers will die of cancer.71 Such instances of
corporate induced deaths have not only represented the worst in
corporate irresponsibility, they have created the need for greater
deterrent efforts in the form of a new product liability theory: cor-
porate homicide.
III. ATrTUDES AS A MOLDING ELEMENT IN CORPORATE
LIABILITY THEORY
A corporation was regarded as a "citizen"7 2 early in our history,
entitling it to rights and protection the same as any other citizen,
including rights of due process, 7 3 equal protection, 74 and more re-
cently, free speech as interpreted by the first amendment.7 5 In-
cumbent with these rights, the responsibilities of citizenship with
its concomitant liability for crime should also attach; however, the
law has been reluctant to attach such liability either in tort76 or
under criminal law.77
69. 125 CONG. REC. E5658 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Miller); see
also 60 MINUTES, supra note 1, at 6.
70. While the U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, and many
American insurance companies appeared to be aware of the asbestos danger as
early as 1918, see note 49 supra; it is not known for sure that officials of the asbes-
tos industry had such knowledge until the early 1930's. 125 CONG REC. E5657
(daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Miller); Bruck, The Armies of Asbestos,
AM. LAW, Nov. 1979, at 21, col. 2; see also text at pgs. 710-11 supra.
71. Asbestos Standard Revised, TRIAL Jan. 1976, at 4.
72. Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544
(1923). But see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (8 Wall. 1868), which held that corpora-
tions did not qualify as a "person" within the privileges and immunities clause,
U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, col. 2. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 U.S. 519 (13 Pet. 1839).
73. Both due process rights and equal protection were recognized as ex-
tending to corporations in New York Central & Hudson River R. Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1909). For a general discussion of corporate rights
analogous to those afforded to biological citizens, see Green, Corporations as Per-
sons Citizens and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L REV. 202 (1946).
74. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
75. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
76. The case of Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B. 1612).
77. Anoymous Case No. 935, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701).
A. A Glance into History
Today's difficulty in dealing with the corporate "person" vividly
contrasts with the historical view that society was comprised of
an aggregation of families rather than a collection of individuals. 78
Ancient law was framed around a "system of small independent
corporations." 79 Author Christopher Stone noted that as late as
Anglo-Saxon times, blood feuds were still being instituted on the
assumption that the clan rather than the individual perpetrator,
might be liable for the offense.80
More modernly, the law has seemed to concentrate its locus of
punishment on the individual and has lost sight of the group.B1
Part of this shift is due to the increasing reliance on individual-
ized penalties which effectively preclude group punishment.8 2
The conceptual dichotomy becomes evident through the words of
Blackstone.
[AJU personal rights die with the person; and as the necessary forms of
investing a series of individuals, one after another, with the same identical
rights would be very inconvenient, if not impracticable; it has been found
necessary ... to constitute artificial persons, who may maintain a perpet-
ual succession and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.8 3
Granted perpetual life by the state, they also enjoyed limited li-
ability. A corporation cannot commit treason, felony, or other
crimes in its corporate capacity.8 4 Nor, as H.L. Menken gravely
observed, could a corporation be excommunicated, for it had no
soul.8 5
Corporations then were not accountable for crimes against the
Crown; therefore, they could not be tried by the King's Bench,
and they remained exempt from summons by the ecclessiastical
courts.
8 6
78. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 121 (1864).
79. Id. at 122. Carrying the analogy further, Maine wrote: "Corporations never
die, and accordingly primitive law considers the entities with which it deals ...
the partriarchal or family groups, as perpetual and inextinguishable." Id. (empha-
sis in original).
80. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS 8 (1975). For a comical judicial restate-
ment of another feud between the Montagues and Capulets, see Tricoli v.
Centalanza, 100 N.J.L. 231, 126 A. 214 (1924).
81. C. STONE, supra note 80, at 9.
82. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 637 (1902);
1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 449-62 (2d ed. 1898); 2
id. 495-97.
83. W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND
608 (B. Gauit ed. 1941).
84. Case of Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B. 1612).
85. The legal fiction has "no pants to kick or soul to damn and, by God, it
ought to have both!" As quoted in STONE, supra note 80, at 3: citing H.L. Menken,
A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND
MODERN SOURCES 223 (1942).
86. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
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B. The Double Standard of Criminal Justice
C. Wright Mills once observed that "[ilt is better, so the image
runs, to take one dime from each of ten million people at the
point of a corporation than $100,000 from each of ten banks at the
point of a gun."8 7 This observation reflects today's prevailing atti-
tude that indicted corporate defendants are not criminals but
respected citizens. 88 An article appearing in the Atlantic
Monthly, noted that
[tihe business criminal tends to counterfeit the good citizen, taking care
to meet all the conventional tests-flag worship, old soldier sentiment, per
fervid patriotism. Full well he knows that giving a fountain or a park or
establishing a college chair in Neolithic drama . . .will more than out-
weigh the dodging of taxes, the grabbing of streets and the corrupting of
city counsels.88
What has emerged is a legal justice system that represents a
class prejudice so evident that it leads citizens to question the
fairness and the integrity of our system of justice.90 "Throughout
history the magnitude of the crime has been lessened by the mag-
nitude of the criminal."91 The resulting double standard perme-
87. C. MILLS, POWER EurrE 95 (1956).
88. See Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. Cswm. LC.
& P.S. 40 (1978).
89. Ross, The Criminaloid, 99 ATLANTIc MONTHLY 44, 48 (1907), cited in Geis,
Criminal Penalties for Corprate Criminals, 8 CRi. L BuLL. 377, 378 (1972). Differ-
ences exist in views of the corporation's role in society. During testimony at a
senate hearing consumer advocate Ralph Nader was espousing on the deficiencies
of the corporation. "If there are criminal penalties for the poor and deprived when
they break the law, then there must be criminal penalties for the automobile in-
dustry when its executives knowingly violate standards designed to protect citi-
zens from injuries and systematic fraud." L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1971, pt. 1, at 5, col.
1.
At that, an angry Senator Ted Stevens (R.Alaska) slapped his hand down and
interrupted, "You look for the worst in people and not in what's good that's hap-
pening in our country. You're not giving credit to American industry .... " Id.
Nader retorted; "Do you give credit to a burglar because he doesn't burglarize 99
percent of the time?" Id.
90. See Cook, The Corrupt Society, NATION, June 1, 1963, at 453.
91. W. DuRATr, THE LIFE OF GREECE 405 (1939) cited in Geis, Criminal Penal-
ties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRim. L.I. 377, 388 (1972); see also Hearings on S.
1722 and S. 1723 Before the the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. XIV, at 10137 (1979) (statement of M. Green) [hereinafter cited as Crimi-
nal Code Reform Hearings]. The idea has been put into prose by poet Robert
Graves:
It is a sin to steal a pin
But Guineas are fair game
The hound who hounds a million pounds
Writes 'Lord' before his name.
Geis, supra, at 388 (citing R. GRAVEs, THEY HANGED My SAINTLY BLLY 57 (1957)).
ates the realm of criminal justice.92
If antitrust enforcement is indicative of corporate criminal en-
forcement as a whole, then any effort to expand the criminal sanc-
tion to include the product field need hardly give corporate
officials any alarm. The history of antitrust enforcement indicates
that severe criminal penalties have rarely been imposed directly
upon policy makers. During the first five decades of the antitrust
laws 252 criminal prosecutions resulted; from which twenty-four
incurred jail sentences of which thirteen were imposed on union
leaders. Of the eleven cases involving businessmen, ten dealt
with such infractions as threats, intimidations, and violence. In
the one remaining case, the jail sentence was suspended.93
The double standard is further evidenced in sentencing discrep-
ancies. In 1961, seven electrical manufacturers were sent to jail
for thirty days for a conspiracy which took from the public more
than all other robberies and thefts that year combined. One year
later a man in Ashbury Park, New Jersey, stole a $2.95 pair of
sunglasses and a one dollar box of soap and was sent to jail for
four months.94 Other examples exist, such as the case of George
Jackson who was sent to prison for ten years to life for stealing
$70 from a gas station (his third offense), and Joseph Sills, who
received a thousand - year sentence for a robbery netting $73.10.
Yet as of 1972, the total amount of time spent in jail by all busi-
nessmen who violated the antitrust laws was less than two
92. For an amusing look at the double standard, here is an excerpt from Art
Buchwald's The Acquittal of Murder Inc., quoted in Criminal Code Reform Hear-
ings, supra note 91, at 10149-50:
Let me ask you something, Sargeant. If someone came into your house
and started sprinkling arsenic on your food and fed your dog DDT and
poured cyanide into your children's milk, would you arrest him?
Damn right, I would, and I'd see he got sent up for life.
What's the difference between that and a company doing the same thing
to an entire community?
We have no authority to arrest company officials just because they have
no way of getting rid of their pesticides.
Then you mean the average citizen has no recourse when a large corpora-
tion knowingly tries to kill him?
If the government thinks they're doing anything wrong they have ways of
punishing people who dump their waste in the wrong place.
What's the punishment?
I think its a $5,000 fine. It could be less, But [sic.) you better be careful
before you make wild charges such as you have.
Why?
I can arrest you for harrassing a respectable business establishment.
93. Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime, A Prob-
lem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J., 280, 291 (1961), (citing, Staff Report to
the Monopoly Sub-committee, House Committee on Small Business, United States
versus Economic Concentration & Monopoly, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (Staff print
1946)).
94. M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 168 (1972).
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years.95
Given the outrageous conduct of Ford Motor Company and the
asbestos manufacturers cited earlier, it would appear that such
sentencing discrepancies are without justification. Seemingly, the
principle difference between corporate induced deaths and those
incurred in back alleys by gun-wielding individuals is that with
companies, the corpus delecti is provided by internal company
documents, which contain the smoking pistol, spent cartridge, and
the body all rolled into one.
Yet there are differences between corporations and individuals.
First, deaths resulting from business practices can not be consid-
ered premeditated in the same manner as back alley shootings. 96
While Ford officials clearly acted in conscious disregard of the ex-
pected outcome, that is not to say that the intent in designing the
Pinto was to kill their customers. Secondly, the kind of business
practices of concern here, while of a violent effect are indirect in
nature and evoke less concern. Therefore, it could be surmised
that these discrepancies in attitudes toward crime stem in large
part from our fear of, and contempt for acts of direct violence.
Nevertheless, current double standards appear to overcompen-
sate for the indirect nature of corporate crime. Judges often treat
corporate criminals with mild indulgence while giving stricter
sentences to street offenders.97 The reasoning behind this phe-
nomenon was expressed by a District of Columbia judge: "I will
not penalize a businessman trying to make a living when there
95. Id. at 169.
96. Black's Law Dictionary defines "premeditated" in the context of homicide
cases as "[tJhe mental purpose, the formed intent, to take human life." BLACK'S
LAW DIcnONARY 1062 (5th ed. 1979).
97. "It should be pointed out that 75 percent of all corporate crimes are in the
environmental/labor protection area, and according to LEAA, penalties against
corporate officials are far less severe than those against ordinary lawbreakers;
fines are nominal, prison sentences are frequently suspended, and probation is
easily granted." 125 CONG. REC. E5657 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Miller); see also Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. Crim.
LC. & P.S. 40 at 42 (1978).
For a specific example, consider the following contrast in sentencing. On Sep-
tember 18, 1973, Jack Clark, corporate chairman of the Four Seasons Nursing Cen-
ters of America, was convicted for stock fraud after cheating shareholders out of
$200 million. Clark was sentenced to one year in prison and became eligible for
parole in four months.
The next day, in Brooklyn Supreme Court, an eighteen year old Puerto Rican
named Hector Ortiz was sentenced to five years in prison for stealing a car worth
$100. He was not found to have used violence or a gun. J. NEWFIELD, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL JUSTICE xiii (1974).
are felons out on the street."98 Whether the reasoning behind this
phenomenon lies with the white collar, the tie, or the carefully
shined shoes is unknown, but the history of the judiciary's solici-
tious treatment of business felons is a long one.99 For example,
one Judge Woodward, when sentencing real estate executives for
mail fraud said "[yjou are men of affairs, of experience, of refine-
ment, and culture of excellent reputation and standing in the
business and social world."'100 More recently, federal district
court judge, Warren Ferguson wrote, "all people don't need to be
sent to prison. For white collar criminals, the mere fact of prose-
cution, pleading guilty-the psychological trauma of that-is pun-
ishment enough."' 01
Jurors evidently agree. In many trials involving corporate de-
fendants, a process known as jury nullification occurs whereby a
jury will sympathize with the individual corporate defendant as a
result of his impecable manners and mode of dress.102 The result
is that imprisonment is rare.' 03 "[Eiven when the evidence is
strong, a form of jury nullification can occur, where the jurors re-
alize that a well-dressed, white, wealthy, articulate father of three,
might actually go to jail with unkempt, non-white, poor, unedu-
cated street criminals."' 04 When imprisonment does occur, most
if not all corporate officials are sent to the relatively "luxurious"
prison facilities. Many white collar criminals are sentenced to the
98. Geis, supra note 91, at 390 (citing Katz, The White-Collar Criminal, 5
WASHINGTONIAN 40, 65 (1970)).
99. Since 1890, 461 individual defendants have been sentenced to prison
.... In all but 26 criminal cases between 1890 and 1969, ... the
sentences were immediately suspended. Of these remaining 26, only three
involved pure price-fixing by businessmen. The first prison sentence ever
actually served for pure price-fixing by businessmen (i.e., without the in-
volvement of labor or violence) occured in 1959. From fiscal 1960 to fiscal
1970 there have been only two cases, out of 188 criminal cases brought
(counting all of the electrical-equipment cases as one), where some busi-
ness defendants have served jail sentences of from one to 60 days: the
electrical-equipment cases and the plumbing-fixtures case. (emphasis in
original).
M. GREEN, supra note 94, at 167.
100. Criminal Code Reform Hearings, supra note 91 at 10137.
101. Id.
102. Comment, supra note 88, at 48; Ball & Friedman, The Use of Crimnal Sanc-
tions in the Enforement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 197 (1965); see also United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929), in which the incredulous judge ex-
claimed: "How an intelligent jury could have acquitted any of the defendants we
cannot conceive."
103. See, Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CPIM.
L.C. & P.S. 50 (1978); see also M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 167-68
(1972). In 1976, 91% of those convicted in federal court for bank robbery went to
prison while only 17% of those sentenced for embezzlement received a prison sen-
tence. L FLORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS 198 (1980).
104. M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 167-68 (1972).
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Allenwood Federal Prison Camp, a low-security facility with no
fences, bars or even locked doors to keep the inmates from leav-
ing.105
While the double standard in criminal sentencing encompasses
the thinking of jurors and judges alike, of far greater concern are
the businessmen's own attitudes of innocence. In 1961, 1700 exec-
utive readers responded to a survey by the Harvard Business Re-
view.'0 6 In response to one question, four out of every seven
respondents believed that businessmen "would violate a code of
ethics whenever they thought they could avoid detection." 0 7 Half
of the survey respondents felt that "the American business exec-
utive tends to ignore the great ethical laws as they apply immedi-
ately to his work. He is preoccupied chiefly with gain."10 8 The
same year, a corporate executive convicted of an antitrust viola-
tion told the Wall Street Journal, "One of the problems of busi-
ness is what is normal practice, not what is law .... If it is
normal practice, it's ethical-not legal, but ethical." 0 9
Activities such as price-fixing and bribery of foreign officials, for
example, are well-entrenched in the conventional businessman's
"moral code."" 0 Herbert Packer, in his book, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction,"' wrote that such behavior as price-fixing or
bribery fails "to excite the necessary sense of indignation and
outrage that it takes for criminal sanctions to be unsparingly ap-
plied." Even after being convicted, some businessmen fail to per-
ceive themselves as "criminal." A former vice-president of
General Electric, following his conviction of price-fixing as a re-
sult of his activity in the massive electrical equipment price-fixing
conspiracy of the early 1960's, wrote, "All of you know that next
Monday, in Philadelphia, I will start serving a thirty day jail term,
105. Comment, supra note 88, at 48. The Berrigans, the Hollywood Ten, the
Watergate felons, and similar white-collar offenders have all spent brief terms at
Allenwood. Thomas F. Clendenin, who served a brief sentence there said, "This is
a piece of cake." L. FORER, CRIMINALS AND VIcTmIs 201 (1980).
106. Comment, supra note 88, at 48.
107. G. GEIS, WHIrE COLLAR CRimINAL 119 (1968); see also M. GREEN, supra note
94, at 148.
108. Id. Such statements tend to make Greek historian Polybius appear clair-
voyant as he noted two millennia ago, "[alt Carthage, nothing which results in
profits is regarded as disgraceful." THE HISTORY OF POLYBIUS 393 (1923), cited in G.
GEIS, supra note 107, at 119.
109. Cook The Corrupt Society, NATION, June 1, 1963, at 458.
110. Comment, supra note 88, at 41, (citing, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, White
Collar Justice, 759 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA 1976) pt. 11, at 3).
111. H. PACKER, THE LIMTS OF THE CRnIINAL SANCTION 359 (1968).
along with six other businessmen for conduct which has been in-
terpreted as being in conflict with the complex antitrust laws."" 2
Evidence appears to indicate that the discrepancies between
criminal sanctions for lower class individualized crime and that of
upper echelon business and corporate crime, reflect a double
standard." 3 Consumers are beginning to understand the nature
of corporate crime, particularly when they perceive the economic
and physical injury which may flow to them." 4 Moreover, when
the public is made aware of what has been termed "white collar
crime," the use of criminal sanctions is clearly favored." 5
Surveys indicate that people feel the wearing of a white collar is a
privilege which should carry with it a kind of public trust, a fiduci-
ary relationship, which when violated, requires criminal punish-
ment.1 1 6
A large portion of today's public believes there is institutional
favoritism; a favoritism which affects our judges, our jurors and
ultimately our policies of law enforcement." 7
IV. CURRENT THEORIES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Indicative of its label, products liability is concerned with the
responsibility of a manufacturer who places or allows a defec-
tive" 8 product to be placed into the stream of commerce. It has
112. Comment, supra note 88, at 42 n.15 (citing G. GEIs, DETERMINING CORPO-
RATE CRIME, THE CONSUMER & CORPORATE AccoUNTABLrLY 337, 349 (R. Nader ed.
1973)). The remarks of the president of the Allen Bradley Company, which was
one of the companies involved in the clandestine operation, did not have the same
impression of innocense that was conveyed by General Electric's vice-president.
"No one attending the gatherings was so stupid he didn't know the meetings were
in violation of the law. But it is the only way business can be run. It is free enter-
prise." Cook, supra note 109, at 457.
113. "The typical white-collar criminal is a white, middle-aged, and well edu-
cated business or professional man. He is unlikely to go to jail, regardless of the
extent of his crime. He may have embezzled more than a million dollars, but he
will be placed on probation. The typical street criminal is young, non-white, male,
poor and uneducated. His robbery or burglary may yield only ten dollars, but he
is likely to be sentenced to jail." L. FORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS, 195 (1980); see
also text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
114. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimated in 1974 that white-collar crime
directly costs the U.S. over $41 billion a year, a figure 200 times the amount stolen
by all bank robbers that year. Id.
115. Comment, supra note 88, at 43.
116. Comment, supra note 88, at 43 n.23. The Joint Commission on Correctional
Manpower found a strong public disposition to sentence accountants who embez-
zle more harshly than either young burglars or persons caught looting during a
riot. Id. (citing G. GElS, DETERRING CORPORATE CRIME; THE CONSUMER & CORPO-
RATE AccOuNTABIrrY 337, 343 (R. Nader ed. 1973)).
117. M. GREEN, supra note 94, at 147.
118. A "defect" can be comprised of numerous types, but is generally one of
four. (1) defect in manufacture in which liability is based on the negligence of one
party within the manufacturing process; (2) defect in design in which the product
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been, from its inception with Winterbottom v. Wright," 9 roughly
140 years ago, perhaps the single most progressive area of the law.
Commencing with Coachman Winterbottom's fall from atop a
royal mailcoach onto the English countryside below, products lia-
bility has been the consumer's civil guardian against errant man-
ufacturers.120
While certainly progressive, product litigation has nonetheless
followed three well recognized theories of recovery: negligence,121
breach of warranty,122 and since the 1962 decision of Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products,123 strict liability.
Such civil liability theories, while adequately addressing the
loss distribution problems that arise from injuries sustained by a
defective product, are inadequate to deal with problems at the ex-
treme end of the culpability scale.' 24 The instances of corporate
itself is inpuned; (3) express or implied warranty where the product does not live
up to the express promises of the seller or to the implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose; and (4) defective warning,
which is given were not sufficiently clear, conspicous or failed to sufficiently create
apprehension in the consumer to appreciate the danger. See D. NOEL & J.
PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABIIrY 359 (1976).
119. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The statement actually is a misnomer since
people have been injured by products for as long as there have been products to
be injured by. Winterbottom v. Wright, however, has withstood the test of time as
being the traditional starting point in any discussion of products liability.
120. For an amusing view of products liability, see R. Sloan, Daisey Wiffie v.
Twitter Bird Seed Company, reprinted in PROSSER, THE JuDIcAL HuMORIsT 20 (W.
Prosser ed. 1952).
121. "The rule that has finally emerged is that the seller is liable for negligence
in the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably be expected to
be capable of inflicting substantial harm if it is defective." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 643 (4th ed. 1971).
122. Warranties are of two types: express and implied. Material misrepresen-
tations of the seller's product, even if innocently made in the contract itself, adver-
tisements or product labels, upon which a buyer has reasonably relied is
considered breach of an express warranty.
If the buyer relies upon the seller to provide a product reasonably fit for the par-
ticular purpose it was made, the law imposes upon a seller, even in the absence of
express provisions, implied warranties of mechantability and fitness for a particu-
lar purpose. D. NOEL & J. PHI.LIPS, PRODUCTS LIABLIrY 36 (1976).
123. 59 Cal 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) While using a combina-
tion power tool, a piece of wood flew out from the machine striking the plaintiff in
the head and inflicting serious injury. In imposing strict liability, the court stated:
"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a de-
fect that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
700.
124. When corporate officers consciously decide to risk human life for added
profit, the focus must be one of deterrence instead of compensation. "Moral culpa-
bility is of secondary importance in tort law-immoral conduct is simply one of
misbehavior endanger not just one individual but the public as a
whole. As such, to charge corporate defendants with a tort rather
than a crime does not address the public wrong which has been
done. Tort actions involve only the notion of individualized com-
pensatory reparation aimed at private wrongs while crimes entail
a public wrong with public penalties.125 As a consequence of the
compensation goal inherent under civil liability theory, efforts to
deter the type of gross misconduct addressed in this article rely
upon the concept of punitive damages.
A. Deterrent Effects of the Punitive Damage Award
Taken from criminal law,126 the award of punitive or exemplary
damages is the one remedy available to the products liability field
to punish127 and deter 28 conduct, which seriously endangers
human life. The doctrine is characterized by both an ancient ori-
gin129 and a nearly complete acceptance in this country.130
the various ways in which individuals suffer economic damage. But the penal law
... the immorality of the actor's conduct is essential ...." HALL, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAw 203 (1947), reprinted in Meuller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19
U. Prrrs. L. REV. 21, 38 (1957).
125. The dichotomies between torts and crimes were addressed by noted torts
scholar William Prosser who noted:
A tort is not the same thing as a crime, although the two sometimes have
many features in common .... A crime is an offense against the public at
large,. . . [tJhe purpose of such a proceeding is to protect and vindicate
the interests of the public as a whole,.
The civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is commenced and main-
tained by the injured person himself, and its purpose is to compensate
him for the damage he has suffered ....
W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 7 (4th ed. 1971).
126. For an excellent discussion of goal similarities between criminal law and
punitive damages, see Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages
Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408 (1967). Consider further the following obiter dic-
tum: "We concede that smart money allowed by a jury, and a fine imposed at the
suit of the people, depend on the same principle. Both are penal, and intended to
deter others from the commission of like crime." Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill. 466, 41 Am.
Dec. 757, 757-58 (N.Y. 1844).
127. See, e.g., Campbell Estates, Inc. v. Bates, 21 Ariz. App. 162, 517 P.2d 515
(1973); A WATSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES,
§ 714, at 846 (1901); Schmidt v. Central Hardware Co., 516 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974).
128. See, e.g., Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708-09, 496 P.2d 939, 945-46
(1972); Fletcher v. Western Natl. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
129. It appears that the earliest recorded system of law to employ the punitive
remedy dates back as far as 2000 B.C. with the code of Hammurabi. Other early
systems included the Hittite Law in 1400 B.C. and the Hindu Code of Manu in 200
B.C.. The Bible too makes reference to damages in excess of actual harm avail-
able under the Hebrew Covenant Code of Mosaic Law. See Exodus 22:1; R. PFEIF-
FER, INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 210 (1948); see also K REDDEN,
PUNITIvE DAMAGES 24-25 (1980).
The first case to articulate the theory of punitive damages in English law was
Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (KB. 1763). Of even greater historical intrigue
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As a consequence of the deterrent-punishment goal, the basis
for an award of punitive damages is the defendant's mental state,
not his conduct.131 Courts have used a plethora of terms to de-
scribe the required state of mind: "malicious,"' 132 "reckless,"133
"oppressive,"' 134 and "wilful or wanton."135 While these terms
have not been precisely defined nor consistently applied,136 two
elements common among them are a culpable state of mind and
the existence of extreme conduct which substantially deviates
from the norm.137
Despite the intended purpose of punishment and deterrence,
punitive damage awards are afflicted with several handicaps
which preclude their effectiveness in combating the type of corpo-
rate wrongdoing addressed by this article.
1. The Insurability of Punitive Risk
The objective of deterrence can be attained only to the extent
appropriate wrongdoers are in fact punished. The effect of indem-
nification agreements138 is to shift the punishment to third par-
is the confusion brought about nearly 100 years later in the case of Day v. Wood-
worth, 54 U.S. 363 (1951). It was in the Day decision that the United States
Supreme Court, failing to cite authority, made reference to the punitive damage
award having received judicial support "for more than a century." 54 U.S. at 371.
That simple remark sent historians scurrying to the library since the reference in-
dicated a punitive damage consideration at least 12 years prior to Huckle. Either
the Day Court was in error, or the historians were poor detectives, for today schol-
ars have yet to uncover the referenced decision.
130. As of this writing all but four states allow for punitive damages. Those that
reject the doctrine are Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington.
131. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 205 (1973). The necessary mental state necessi-
tating a punitive damage sanction is either an awareness of, or indifference to an
unnecessary risk of danger. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1362 (1976). This would include a manufacturer's in-
tentional misrepresentation of the safety of its products. Id. Examples of cases
involving the element of mental culpability would have to include the MER/29
cases which are excellently discussed in Owen, supra at 1330-1334; see, e.g., Sabich
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976); Barth v.
B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968).
132. See, e.g., Achenson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 490 P.2d 832 (1971); Satterfield
v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 253 Ark. 181, 485 S.W.2d 192 (1972).
133. See, e.g., Augustine v. Hinnen, 201 Kan. 710, 443 P.2d 354 (1968); Beggs v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1966).
134. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972).
135. See, e.g., Friedman v. Jordan, 166 Va. 65, 184 S.E. 186 (1936).
136. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 78 (1980).
137. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 206 (1973).
138. A 1974 survey of the Fortune 500 list revealed that 80% of those companies
ties; however, this also shifts the retributive and deterrent
effects. 39 Thus deterrent function is, at least partially, lost.140
Public policy goals are further thwarted because some manufac-
turers regard liability insurance as a cost-saving substitute for
product safety programs.14' Some commentators believe indem-
nification from penal liability should be prohibited, discounting
the arguments that such indemnification should be available to
assure compensation for victims of product accidents and to pro-
tect those manufacturers guilty only of inadvertent errors against
unpredictable future losses. 42 But it is an entirely different mat-
ter when a manufacturer, guilty of an aggravated act of miscon-
duct, can insure itself against the punishment of that conduct. In
this situation, the accident victim presumably has already re-
ceived compensation for his injuries under traditional civil reme-
dies, thereby leaving the only remaining question as whether or
not public policy should allow an insured to indemnify himself
against the penal aspect of his conduct.
carried indemnification insurance. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING
THE GIANT CORPORATION 107 (1976).
139. In the words of one commentator.
The deterrent function of the law of torts was severely, perhaps fatally,
undermined by the advent of liability insurance.... The basic assump-
tion of the penal theory had always been that the financial impact of an
adverse verdict would serve to warn the tortfeasor and others against the
consequences of substandard conduct. But it could have such an educa-
tive effect only so long as he would feel that deterrent lash. Liability in-
surance cushioned him against its impact in advance, and thus removed
the primary incentive toward the observance of care....
Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 823-24
(1967).
140. There are several factors which prevent the retributive and deterrent ef-
fect from being completely lost. Due to dramatic increases in products liability
claims, insurance premiums have risen, as have policy cancellations. As reported
by a recent U.S. Department of Commerce study, "[i]ncreases reported (to the
Small Business Administration) in 1975 ranged from 100 percent to over 800 per-
cent .... Cumulative increases over the past seven years have been reported to
be in excess of 5000 percent." BUREAU OF DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE - ASSESSMENT OF RELATED PROBLEMS
AND ISSUES 7, 72 (1976). The ultimate effect of increased product liability litigation
is beneficial because it forces manufacturers to improve product safety despite be-
ing insured against product injury claims. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1310 (1976).
141. Such an assertion percolated from research conducted for the National
Commission on Product Safety. That same research report found that, "[i] n some
instances, the manufacturers apparently do not even inform themselves of the
final resolution of the [products liability] claims, and for these manufacturers it is
obvious that a court decision will have no direct effect on product design or warn-
ing decisions." Owen, supra note 140 at 1308 n.340, citing Whitford, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY, 3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES -
PRODUCT SAFETY LAW & ADMINISTRATION: FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND COMMON
LAw 221, 228 (1970).
142. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1258, 1313 (1976).
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One view is set forth in the case of In re Guardianship of Estate
of Smith .143
Where exemplary damages are awarded for purposes of punishment and
deterrence, as is true in this state, public policy should require that pay-
ment rest ultimately as well as nominally on the party who committed the
wrong; otherwise they would often serve no useful purpose. The objective
to be obtained in imposing punitive damages is to make the culprit feel
the pecuniary punch, not his guiltless guarantor. 14 4
The Smith court placed stress upon the negative impact insur-
ance has on the deterrent effects of punitive damages.145
A contrary view focuses on the insurers' contractual obligation
to compensate the insured for those amounts which the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.146 In Abbie Uriguen
Oldsmobile Buick Inc., v. United States Fire Ins. Co. ,147 Justice
Donaldson reasoned that insurance coverage of punitive damages
verdicts actually promotes law enforcement by encouraging plain-
tiffs to sue defendants guilty of particularly antisocial conduct.S48
This analysis, however, fails to recognize that private enforcement
of the law is desirable because of its punitive and deterrent im-
pact on the wrongful behavior. The argument of Justice Donald-
son is therefore circular. The rule allowing insurance coverage for
punitive damages is adopted in part because it promotes the sec-
ondary goal of encouraging litigation of wantonly inflicted injury;
in turn, litigation of these claims is desired to advance the pri-
mary goals of punishment and deterrence; yet punishment and
deterrence are now shifted to a third party, the insurer.
Equally enlightening as arguments of public policy is the lan-
guage contained within the insurance policy itself. The general
language of most property and liability policies provide coverage
for "all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of bodily injury."149 A minority of courts
143. 211 Kan. 397, 507 P.2d 189 (1973); see also Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v.
McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
144. 211 Kan. at 405, 507 P.2d at 196.
145. In Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, Judge Wisdom ad-
dressed the paradox of allowing a defendant to pass the punishment to his insurer
who, in the form of higher premiums, passes it to the public. "Society would then
be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured." Id. at 441.
146. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972)
(en banc); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95
Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
147. 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973).
148. Id. at 509, 511 P.2d at 791.
149. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 681 (1980).
have held that because punitive damages are awarded as punish-
ment to the defendant and as a deterrent to others, they arise
from the defendant's grievous conduct and not "because of bodily
injury."150 The clear majority of courts, however, construe the
general insuring language broadly so as to resolve the issue in
favor of coverage.151 A good illustration is the South Carolina
courts' interpretation of a typical automobile policy as providing
coverage for punitive damages.152 The court determined that pu-
nitive damages were clearly a sum the insured was "legally obli-
gated to pay" and found that such an obligation arose as a result
of "bodily injury," a term contained within the policy's lan-
guage.15 3
In response to those court holdings that exemplary awards
were to be covered, the insurance industry formulated and en-
dorsed a specific punitive damages exclusion. 5 4 For various rea-
sons, however, national acceptance was never received and the
Insurance Services Office withdrew the exclusion. 55
Yet, absent an express insurance policy exclusion, it remains
arguable that the general language of most insurance policies
does not include punitive damages. 56 This was brought out in
Crull v. Gleb,157 which found that punitive awards are beyond the
scope of ordinary damages because bodily injury is involved and
these injuries arise out of the defendant's aggravated conduct.
Nevertheless, typical policy language, runs the counter argument,
does not forewarn the insured that there is no coverage for puni-
150. Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100, 213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973); Crull v. Gleb,
382 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
151. See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R. 3d 343 (1968); see e.g., Pennsylvania Thresh-
ermen & Farmer's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thorton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); Glen
Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952); Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) cert. den. 295 U.S. 734
(1935).
152. Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
153. Id. at 205, 139 S.E.2d at 910; see also Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345
F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972).
154. Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Services Office News Release
(March 29, 1978); see also Chiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Libility
Ca.ses, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 245, 250-51 (1977).
155. K. REDDEN. PuNrrvE DAMAGES 687 (1980).
156. Id. at 688.
157. 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). In Crull, the Missouri court stated:
There is no language in the policy that provides for the payments of judg-
ments for punitive damages. The policy covers only damages for bodily
injury and property damage sustained by any person. Punitive damages
do not fall in this category. The $2,000 award of punitive damages to plain-
tiff was to punish defendant for his wrongful acts and as a warning to
others. It was not to compensate plaintiff for bodily injury or property
damages.
382 S.W.2d at 23.
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tive damages. 5 8 Since the insurer drafted the policy and could
have made clear its intention to exclude coverage for punitive
damages, the rules of construction require the insurer to bear the
burden of the ambiguity. 5 9 Until general policy language is refor-
mulated into a clearer statement of coverage intent, public policy
goals of punishment and deterrence will continue to be shifted to
third parties.
2. Punitive Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death
As previously noted, Ford Motor Company and the asbestos
manufacturers possessed a conscious and reckless disregard for
consumer and worker safety which ultimately led to the death of
several hundred people.160 It is therefore of critical import that
under present liability schemes, as many as thirty-one states do
not allow punitive damages where the plaintiff dies from his inju-
ries.16' The apparent rationale is that the legislative intent be-
hind wrongful death statutes is compensation rather than
punishment, 62 and thus, absent specific statutory authority to the
contrary, courts interpret the statutes narrowly.163
Denial of punitive damages in such circumstances stems from
the English common law rule in Lord Campbell's Act, which did
not permit an action for wrongful death. 64 The result is that to-
day a majority of American courts adhere to a liability theory
which reduces business' incentive to improve its products.165
A better reasoned view is that represented by the minority po-
sition which allows for the punishment and deterrent effects of
exemplary damages to apply where death is the result.16 6 Only
158. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 688.
159. Id. at 688.
160. See notes 28-70 supra and accompanying text.
161. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 87 (1980); Note, Constitutional Law-Wrong-
ful Death, 8 Cum. L. REV. 567, 574 (1977).
162. See Kollin v. Shaff, 79 Misc. 2d 49, 359 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
163. See, e.g., Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo. App. 335, 535 P.2d 219 (1975).
164. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K-B. 1808). Reluctance was due to the
English maxim that the "death" of personal tort actions coincided with the death
of either the plaintiff or the defendant. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 576 (3rd ed. 1923).
165. See Martin v. United Security Serv., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975); Mcclel-
land & Truett, Survival of Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 8 U.S.F.L.
REV. 585 (1974).
166. See Note, Constitutional Law-Wrongful Death, 8 Cum. L REV. at 575 (not-
ing as many as eighteen states which follow the minority rule). The following
states have enacted statutes specifically permitting punitive damages in wrongful
393
nineteen minority jurisdictions have upheld the traditional goals
of punishment, deterrence and the protection against reckless or
malicious conduct. 167 The majority view of liability is insufficient
to address this type of culpability and its punishment. The need
to address these conflicting goals of liability insurance and the
punishment of wrongdoers presents a need for a new theory in
products liability.
V. THE LEGAL HURDLES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence has long recognized the existence of
two types of persons: juristic and natural.168 In reality, the "juris-
tic person" is not a person at all, but an artificial entity created by
the state, while the term "natural person" embraces all
humans.' 69 The study of corporations therefore is the study of an
enigma. They are at once the movers of mountains, the builders
of skyscrapers, and the creators of jobs while, at the same time,
considered "artificial beings" and "legal fictions." 7 0 The result
has been the development of several conceptual barriers which
must be pierced before any thoughts of corporate criminal homi-
cide may be entertained. Perhaps of even greater importance are
considerations of the practical problems which perpetuate the
conceptual. Both perplexities are discussed below.
A. The Conceptual Dilemmas
1. The Missing Link of Corporate Intent
Behavior can be punished as criminal only if associated with a
certain mental state.' 7 ' Early writers reasoned that a fictitious
death actions: Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. States permitting puni-
tive awards by judicial interpretation of their death statute include: Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee and West Virginia.
167. See Comment, Punitive Damages & Their Possible Application in Automo-
bile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036, 1039 (1960). Representing an apparent
hybrid view is the case of Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d
721 (1972). In Smith, the Maryland court applied the traditional reasons for per-
mitting punitive damages in the context of a survival action, but was careful to dis-
tinguish wrongful death actions as inapplicable since a survival action is an
extension of the decedent's cause of action, while the wrongful death action is a
separate cause of action.
168. Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HAv. L. REV. 253, 262-63 (1911); see also
C. ELUiovr: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 9 (1900).
169. Id.
170. Origin of the "fiction" theory extends as far back as the 13th century with
Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) receiving personal credit. Dewey, The Historic Back-
ground of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE LJ. 655, 665 (1926); see also Com-
ment, Corporations: Recent Treatment of the Corporate Fiction, 13 CORNELL L.Q.
99, 105 (1927).
171. Traditionally signified by the term mens rea or guilty mind; see Smith v.
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being, existing only in the eyes of the law, was incapable of inten-
tionally, knowingly, or wilfully doing anything.172 Corporations
were deemed immune from criminal activity of any sort.173
Herein lies the misconception, noted by legal scholar Arthur W.
Machen Jr.: "A corporation cannot be at the same time 'created
by the state' and fictitious. If a corporation is 'created', it is real,
and therefore cannot be a purely fictitious body having no exist-
ence except in the legal imagination."174 "Artificial" and "ficti-
tious" can not be equated with "non-existence." Corporations are
indeed as real as their impact on society demonstrates. They are
a composition of individuals working as a finely-tuned group, the
conduct of which can be vastly different when acting in a collec-
tive capacity than in the capacity of individuals. 175
In the civil realm, this point was judicially recognized by the
theory of respondeat superior, which reasoned that strict liability
can be imposed on a corporation because of the acts of its officers
and agents. 7 6 Those acts of the officers are the response to pur-
poses, motives, and intent that are as much a part of the corpora-
tion as are the tangible acts done.177 Respondeat superior in the
context of civil proceedings, imputed the requisite acts and intent
of its human agents to that of the corporate master. The doctrine
was never originally applied to the criminal arena.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 28 (1890);
Karlen, Mens Rea: A New Analysis, 9 U. OF TOL L. REV. 191 (1978).
172. Taken from the opinion in New York Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 at 492 (1909).
173. See Chief Justice Holt's decision in Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B.
1701) wherein he observes, "a corporation is not indictable but the particular
members of it are." See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EN-
GLAND 476 (4th ed. J. Andrews 1899) ("A corporation cannot commit treason or
feloney or any other crime in its corporate capacity .... )
174. Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 257 (1911). Gierke
noted the following: "A 'universites' (corporate body) ... is a living organism
and a real person, with a body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will,
itself can act ... it is a group person and its will is a group will." 0. GIERKE, PO-
LTIcAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE xxvi (F. Maitland trans, 1902) (cited in
Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655,
658 (1926)).
175. Comment, Corporations.- Recent Treatment of the Corporate Fiction, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 99, 100 (1927).
176. The acts must be "done for the benefit of the principal, while the agent is
acting within the scope of his employment," before they will be imposed on the
corporation. New York Central supra, note 172 at 493.
177. New York Central supra, note 172 at 492-93, citing Bishop's New Criminal
Law § 417 (sic].
It was of great consequence when the decision in Telegram
Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth178 issued respondeat superior
into the criminal setting. The factual background entailed a cor-
poration held liable for criminal contempt in publishing a newspa-
per article about a trial and distributing copies of the paper at
that trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court and noted the policy that intent cannot be imputed to a cor-
poration in a criminal setting: "We think that a corporation may
be liable criminally for certain offenses of which a specific intent
may be a necessary element. There is no more difficulty in imput-
ing to a corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings than
in civil."179
The Telegram Newspaper holding was clarified somewhat by
the United States Supreme Court in New York Central & Hudson
River R. Co. v. United States.180 The railroad company was ac-
cused of subverting a special tariff rate between New York and
Detroit by paying rebates to sugar companies making shipments
along that route. The Court delineated the requirements that the
act must not only be done within the scope of the agent's employ-
ment, but it must also be done to benefit the principal corpora-
tion.181 In this case the Court found both requirements fulfilled
and advanced the extension of respondeat superior to the crimi-
nal setting.
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in
holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated
to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest
of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penal-
ties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises.
18 2
The common law barrier to corporate criminal liability is merely
conceptual in nature and can therefore be removed either by im-
puting the intent in criminal cases183 or by disposing of the intent
178. 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899).
179. Id. at 297, 52 N.E. at 446.
180. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
181. Id. at 493. The term "scope of employment" is clarified by the Restatement
of Agency.
Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master;
and,
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the
use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957).
182. 212 U.S. at 494.
183. This was the alternative chosen by Justice Hough in United States v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906):
It seems to me as easy and logical to ascribe to a corporation an evil mind
as it is to impute to it a sense of contractual obligation .... The same law
that creates the corporation may create the crime, and to assert that the
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requirement altogether.184
Today the barrier of intent is opaque, if not completely trans-
parent, with exceptions being continuously carved out to allow for
corporate criminal liability in areas where courts deem the public
policy need is sufficiently great. Criminal intent is no longer an
obstacle for crimes of larceny185 or false pretenses, 8 6 and the
modern trend is toward greater expansion where justified by rea-
sons of public policy.' 87
Under circumstances evincing a reckless disregard for human
life, exemplified by the corporate homicide charge, every reason
in public policy is provided to take one step further to either im-
pute the mens rea of the agents or to dispose of the intent re-
quirement entirely.188 The law should no longer shut its eyes to
legislature punish its own creature because it cannot make a creature ca-
pable of violating the law does not, in my opinion, bear discussion.
Id. at 836.
184. This second option has been given viability by the United States Supreme
Court. In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Court sustained the
principle first set down in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) to hold
that no criminal intent need be shown to establish a violation of the Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970); Comment, supra note 88,
at 40.
185. See, e.g., State v. Turax, 130 Wash. 69, 226 P.2d 59 (1924); People v. Hudson
Valley Const. Co., 217 N.Y. 172, 111 N.E. 475 (1916).
186. See, e.g., State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 166 N.C. 366, 81 S.E. 737 (1914).
187. United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941 (6th Cir. 1963) held that a corpora-
tion could be criminally liable for the act of its president in making an unlawful
payment of corporate funds to a union representative. In State v. Willard, 54 So. 2d
183 (Fla. 1951) (en banc), a Florida corporation was held to have violated the gam-
bling laws.
188. The public policy of protecting human life from products marketed by
manufacturers who (1) profit by the transaction, (2) are aware of the product's
dangers, (3) have the means to diminish the dangers, and (4) choose not to, seem
greater than the public policy question involved in New York Central. In that case
a railroad company was convicted for the illegal payment of rebates to sugar refin-
ery companies in contravention of interstate commerce. In holding the corpora-
tion criminally responsible, reference was made to the issue of public policy.
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why
the corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act through
its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the
knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has entrusted authority to
act in the subject-matter of making and fixing rates of transportation, and
whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation
for which the agents act. [TIhe law . . . cannot shut its eyes to the fact
that the great majority of business transactions in modern times are con-
ducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is
almost entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity from all punish-
ment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually
controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.
the fact that a great majority of business transactions are con-
ducted through corporate bodies and that millions of consumers
are entrusted to their care. Courts need to ascribe to the obvious
logic that "[ilf you can imagine a corporate entity is a person, you
can also imagine that this person has a mind."'189
2. Incapacity to Suffer the Prescribed Penalty
A second conceptual problem in indicting corporations on a
criminal homicide charge is the corporation's incapacity to suffer
the prescribed penalties of imprisonment or death.190 While this
reason alone is seldom regarded as sufficient to maintain criminal
immunity, it is certainly seen as a major factor in determining
whether the legislative intent was to include corporations within
the criminal field of homicide.
Two cases are of particular note in this discussion, for they deal
with the same issue yet reach opposite conclusions. In United
States v. Van Schaick,191 a steamship corporation was indicted for
manslaughter for furnishing defective life preservers to 900 pas-
sengers who ultimately drowned when compelled to jump from
the burning ship. The court considered the conceptual difficulty in
placing a legal fiction behind bars under a federal statute which
provided that "every owner ... through whose fraud, connivance,
misconduct or violation of law the life of any person is destroyed
shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter and upon conviction,
shall be sentenced to confinement by hard labor."1 92 The corpora-
tion claimed that the omission by Congress to specify a penalty
suitable for a corporate entity, i.e., fines, was evidence of the leg-
islature's intent to exclude corporations from the crime. The Van
Schaick court, however, rejected the argument with an interest-
ing line of reasoning. The court stated that the absence of an ap-
propriate punishment did not bar liability because the omission
was indicative of a congressional oversight and not an intention to
immunize corporations under the statute. 93 In doing so, the Van
Schaick court side-stepped a traditional barrier to criminal prose-
cution under criminal statutes, namely, the absence of an appro-
212 U.S. at 495-96.
189. Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655, 668 n.17 (citing Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV L. REv. 253, 347-48
(1911)).
190. In United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1906), the court noted, "[t]here is the obvious physical difficulty of rendering a cor-
poration amenable to corporate punishment. Id. at 836; see also 1 W. BUR-
DICK, LAW OF CRIME 223 (1946).
191. 134 F. 592 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1904).
192. Id. at 594.
193. Id. at 602.
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priate penalty. 94
More recently, in State v. Pacific Powder Co. ,195 the court con-
sidered a more tenuous statutory dilemma. In the summer of
1959, a Pacific Powder dynamite truck was parked near an old
wooden building while the driver left to get something to eat.
While gone, the wooden building caught fire, lit up the truck's
cargo, and resulted in a devastating explosion killing one man.196
Under the state law at that time a corporation was defined as a
"person" unless the context of the statute required otherwise. 197
The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that the idea of corpora-
tions being included within the definition of "person" was not all
encompassing, but legislatively qualified by the provision that
such inclusion should be used unless "the context requires other-
wise."198
Whether or not the context required otherwise was determined
by the prescribed penalties. 199 While Van Schaik found the statu-
tory omission to be an inadvertent oversight, Pacific Powder
concluded that the inherent inability of an artificial person to be
imprisoned was evidence that the legislature did not intend for
corporations to be guilty of the crime.200
The conceptual inability of a corporation to suffer the punish-
ment will likely present few problems as applied today. First, the
problem has seldom been the sole basis for any judicial holding
which leads to the apparent conclusion that courts do not find the
argument conclusive. 201 Second, the trend is to recognize the
194. The case involved demurrers to each of the criminal indictments brought
against the steamboat company. The Van Schaick court overruled the demurrers,
granting leave to plead over. Thus the court made no decision as to what should
be the penalty against a corporate defendant in the absence of an appropriate
sanction.
195. 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961) (en banc).
196. See also Note, Corporate Criminal Liability in Oregon: State v. Pacific
Powder And the New Oregon Criminal Code, 51 OR. L. REV. 587 (1972).
197. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.010 (1953) reads in part: "As used in the statutes relat-
ing to crimes and criminal procedure, unless the context requires otherwise: ....
'Person' includes corporations as well as natural persons." Law of Oct. 19, 1864, ch.
53, § 724 (1845-1864). Gen Laws Or. 577 (repealed 1971).
198. 226 Or. at 505, 360 P.2d at 532.
199. Id. at 505, 360 P.2d at 532. "[T]he intent of the legislature is to be found in
the penalty prescribed for the crime of involuntary nanslaughter."
200. Id. at 505, 360 P.2d at 532. "No doubt should lie in anyone's mind that the
legislature ever considered making corporate entities criminally liable for murder,
for the only penalties provided are either death or imprisonment, penalties incapa-
ble of execution in the manner prescribed by law."
201. See Note, supra note 196, at 594.
agent's and officer's ability to suffer the penalty on behalf of the
corporation that employs them by way of a vicarious criminal lia-
bility.202
3. Corporations as "Persons" under the Statutory Definition
of Homicide
Perhaps a more compelling reason courts have refused to sus-
tain corporate indictments for acts of physicial violence has been
because the common law and statutory definitions of the crime
speak in terms of the slaying of one human being by another.
Since a corporation is not a human being, but only a "juristic per-
son," it is not the intent of the common law or the legislature to
make a corporation answerable for criminal homicide.203
The American Law Institute provides little guidance in the se-
mantic battle waged on behalf of the artificial person. According
to the Model Penal Code, "a person is guilty of criminal homicide
if he purposely, knowlingly, recklessly or negligently causes the
death of another human being."204 Within these definitional pa-
rameters the juristic concept of the corporate person appears to
be excluded. Upon close scrutiny of the Code's general defini-
tions, however, this apparent clarity is transformed into murky
waters of confusion. Within the criminal homicide section, the
Code defines "human being" as "a person who has been born and
is alive,"205 yet prefaces that definition with the phrase, "unless a
different meaning plainly is required," leaving the reader minimal
guidance.206 By turning to the Code's general definitions, "per-
son" is defined as "any natural person and, where relevant, a cor-
poration, or an unincorporated association." 207 The problem
becomes the determination of the term "where relevant." A com-
ment to the Code suggests the term pertains to what the drafters
refer to as "serious crimes," 208 and while that would certainly
seem to include homicide charges, the drafters never make the
delineation.209
202. See Annot., "Corporations Criminal Liability for Homicide", 83 A.L.R. 2d
1117, 1120 (1962).
203. This was the conclusion reached in People v. Rochester Railway and Light
Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 108, 88 N.E. 22, 24 (1909).
204. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); see also
Comment, supra note 9, at 917.
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 1.13(8).
208. Id. § 2.07 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
209. Actually, the lack of clarity is more academic than practical for the drafters
enumerate several offenses, including involuntary manslaughter which has re-
sulted in criminal prosecution. Id.
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Case law has been similarly confused on the subject. That a
corporation could be liable for homicide was recognized early by
a New York court in People v. Rochester Railway and Light Co. 210
Rochester Railway drew upon the Supreme Court's language in
New York Central & Hudson River R. Co. 211 to acknowledge that
corporate liability in civil proceedings for an agent's conduct is
only a step removed from criminal liability.2 12 Premised upon the
idea of respondent superior, the Court seemed greatly tempted to
accept this novel idea that a corporation could commit man-
slaughter,213 but it ultimately determined that the decision would
be based only on the language of the New York Penal Code.214
Thus, the focus shifted to the statutory language, which defined
homicide as "the killing of one human being by the act, procure-
ment or omission of another."215 The court reasoned that in that
particular context, the word "another" was meant to limit liability
for the manslaughter charge to human beings.216
Four years later a similar conclusion was reached in Common-
wealth v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.217 That case arose out of a
rare corporate indictment for involuntary manslaughter following
a train accident in which a passenger was killed. The attorney
general in Kentucky alleged that the fatal accident stemmed from
210. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
211. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
212. 195 N.Y. at 105, 88 N.E. at 23.
But a corporation generally speaking is liable in civil proceedings for the
conduct of the agents through whom it conducts it business so long as
they act within the scope of their authority, real or apparent, and it is but
a step further in the same direction to hold that in many instances it may
be charged criminally with the unlawful purposes and motives of such
agents while so acting in its behalf.
(emphasis added).
213. Court dicta revealed the extent of the temptation. Following a lengthy dis-
cussion of authorities allowing for corporations to be subject to a homicide charge,
the court made the following comment:
Within the principles thus and elsewhere declared, we have no doubt that
a definition of certain forms of manslaughter might have been formulated
which would be applicable to a corportion, and make it criminally liable
for various acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance when resulting in death,
and amongst which very probably might be included conduct in its sub-
stance similar to that here charged against the respondent.
Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24.
214. The Court relied mainly on Penal Code language contained within sections
179, 180 and 193.
215. Id.
216. "We think that this final word 'another' naturally and clearly means a sec-
ond or additional member of the same kind or class ... " Id.
217. 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
the conduct of the agents of the railroad who had operated the
train at such unreasonable speed as to constitute "gross and will-
ful negligence." 218 In analyzing the validity of the indictment, the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Illinois Central noted the lack of
statutory guidance in Kentucky where manslaughter was not de-
fined. The court applied the common law of Kentucky: "Involun-
tary manslaughter is the killing by one person of another person
in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony, nor likely
to endanger life, and without an intention to kill; or where one
kills another while doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner."219
While Kentucky statutes had extended the meaning of "person"
to include corporations, Illinois Central rejected the contention
that a corporation was capable of committing homicide.220 The
court's words are instructive: "in a case of homicide, though it be
involuntary manslaughter, it would, we think, be giving the word
'person' a tortured meaning to say that it includes a corpora-
tion."221
In State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.,222 the New Jersey
Supreme Court was one of the first courts to reverse the trend
and sustain an indictment returned against a corporate defendant
for criminal homicide. In its denial of a motion to quash the in-
dictment, the Lehigh Valley court recognized that a corporation is
ordinarily to be held accountable under the criminal law unless
something in the nature of the offense, the penalty provided, or
the essential elements would render corporate culpability impos-
sible. 223 Noting that section 109 of the Crimes Act provided for a
fine as an alternative to imprisonment, the court concluded that a
corporation could be criminally liable for its own negligence
under a manslaughter statute.224
218. Id. at 321, 153 S.W. at 460.
219. Id. at 321, 153 S.W. at 461. The court cited the persuasive authority of
Thompson on Corporations acknowledging that corporations can not be indicted
for crimes requiring evil intent,
[b Iut beyond this, there is not good reason for their exemption from the
consequences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed by their agents in
pursuance of authority derived from them. Such a rule would, in many
cases, preclude all adequate remedy, and render reparation for an injury,
committed by a corporation impossible; because it would leave the only
means of redress to be sought against irresponsible servants, instead of
against those who truly committed the wrongful act by commanding it to
be done.
220. Id. at 325, 153 S.W. at 461.
221. Id. at 325, 153 S.W. at 461-62.
222. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
223. Id. The court suggested that a corporation could not be prosecuted for
perjury, treason, murder or any crime requiring a "corrupt intent or malus ani-
mus." Id.
224. Id. at 374, 103 A. at 686.
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Of greater difficulty was the definitional aspect of the case. In
dealing with the traditional definition of homicide as the killing of
one human being by another human being, the court observed
that numerous definitions of homicide had been promulgated.225
Focusing upon Blackstone's definition which encompassed acts of
suicide, the Lehigh Valley court held that by including the exam-
ple of suicide, the traditional definition of homicide, that being the
killing of one human being by another, was "inaccurate." 226 The
New Jersey Supreme Court then adopted a more flexible defini-
tion of homicide, and by doing so, it circumvented the semantic
barriers confronted by Rochester Railway and Illinois Central.227
One of the more recent courts to consider the idea of corporate
homicide was a New York court in 1974. The case is People v.
Ebasco Services Inc. ,228 involving a corporation charged with neg-
ligent homicide which resulted when a cofferdam collasped killing
two workmen engaged in construction work on a river bottom. In
attacking the indictment, Ebasco Services claimed that a corpora-
tion could not be indicted for criminally negligent homicide. Plac-
ing heavy reliance on Rochester Railway, the court found needed
precedent for the concept of corporate culpability for homicide. 229
The court's main concern hinged, however, on a question of leg-
islative intent, making the validity of the indictment in Ebasco de-
pendent upon whether the legislature intended the negligent
homicide statute to apply to corporations.230 Again, statutory ex-
pression became critical. At issue was New York Penal Law sec-
tion 125.10 which set forth the vague parameters for homicide. "A
person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with crim-
inal negligence, he causes the death of another person."23 1 The
statute went on to define "person" as a "human being who has
been born and is alive," but the definition was qualified as refer-
ring only to homicide victims.232 The corporate defendant as-
serted that the limitation for the word "person" to human beings
applied to all uses of the term within the homicide definition, in-
cluding the party liable for the death. The Ebasco court, however,
225. Id. at 375, 103 A. at 686.
226. Id.
227. See notes 210-21 supra and accompanying text.
228. 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974).




felt this conclusion contradicted the definition on its face; the
court found that the limitation applied only when "person" re-
ferred to the victim. The Ebasco opinion, moreover, indicated
that the only purpose of this limitiation was to exclude abortions
from the definition of homicide. 233
Unable to find a definition of "person" in the homicide section,
the court employed the broader meaning supplied in the general
definitional section of the penal code: "'Person' means a human
being, and where appropriate, a public or private corpora-
tion. .. *"234 The Ebasco court concluded that since Rochester
Railway authorized the legislature to subject corporate entities
to criminal liability for homicide, there was no manifest impropri-
ety in applying the broader definition of "person."235
In essence, the opinions of Ebasco and Lehigh Valley reflect ju-
dicial bodies that are not willing to frustrate the adaptation of the
criminal law to prevailing social realities. 2 36 The Lehigh Valley
decision was particularly intriguing in that it refused to recognize
artificially created conceptual barriers founded on theoretical ob-
jections and statutory construction. This position was articulated
in the following critique of Rochester Railway:
The case is a good illustration of the way in which the proper growth and
development of the law can be prevented by the hard and fast language of
a statute, and of the advantage of our own system by which the way is
open for a court to do justice by the proper application of legal princi-
ples. 2 3
7
Indeed, all the legal hurdles discussed to this point are concep-
tual in nature, and while the law often becomes engrossed in the
conceptual problems of legal history, such a focus tends to ad-
dress more the interests of theoretical integrity rather than the
interests of practicality.
B. Practical Considerations
Opponents of corporate criminal liability advance several justi-
fications for retaining the limited scope of this liability. One rea-
233. Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11. "As the revisers make clear, the definition
contained in section 125.05(1) of the Penal Law was inserted merely to insure that
the death of a 'person' would not include the abortional killing of an unborn child."
Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
234. Id.
235. Id. This approach actually begs the question. Since "person" includes cor-
porations only "where appropriate" the question is whether the legislature in-
tended the homicide statute to apply to corporations. Rochester Railway, which
extends liability for homicide to corporations by dicta, does not mean that such
liability was in fact created or intended by the statute.
236. Id.
237. 90 N.J.L. at 376, 103 A. at 686.
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son is the resulting inequity to innocent parties. 238 Shareholders,
are one such group, who in the final analysis feel the sting of any
verdict against a corporation. Yet they are most likely innocent of
personal wrongdoing and incapable of exerting any effective con-
trol over actions of the corporate agents.23 9
While innocent shareholders are similarly "stung" by civil dam-
age awards, it is critical to understand that corporate liability is
achieved by the concept of vicarious liability which arose in the
civil arena. As such, a criminal liability theory that penalizes in-
nocent shareholders is a "substantial departure from the ordinary
rule that a principal is not answerable criminally for the acts of
his agent without the principal's authorization, consent or knowl-
edge."240
In addition to the basic unfairness theory was the idea of an
"historical quid pro quo." 241 Since the investor already had to
deal with the inherent economic risk, the courts did not choose to
impose an additional legal risk as well, in fear that capital invest-
ments would be curtailed.242
In actual practice, however, criminal liability may not be the
substantial departure that was originally presumed. If it is true
that decisions to market "defective products in flagrant disregard
of excessive dangers spring from the intensity of the profit motive
rather than from animus toward consumers, '243 then such behav-
ior could be impliedly consented to and authorized by the share-
holder who seeks a high return on his investment. Moreover, any
impact upon the shareholder is minimized in at least two ways.2 "
First, shareholder losses are limited only to the amount of indi-
vidual capital investment.245 Secondly, it is believed by some that
corporations often transfer the costs of fines to the consumer in
238. Owen, Punititive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. at 1301; see also, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 12 (4th ed. 1971).
239. See note 265 infra and accompanying text.
240. W. LAFAVE & A. Scoar JR., CRIMINAL LAW 231 (1972) (emphasis added).
241. C. STONE, supra note 80, at 23.
242. Id.
243. Owen, supra note 140, at 1304.
244. Actually there is a third way but it requires affirmative action on the part
of the shareholder. Shareholders can protect themselves from wrongful acts of
management by means of derivative actions discussed in N. LATFIN, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 410-62 (2d ed. 1971).
245. It is fundamental hornbook law that one of the magnetic features in corpo-
rate development has been the concept of limited shareholder liability. H. HENN,
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 79 (1961).
the form of higher product prices. 2 4 6
Another concern is the impact of placing criminal liability on
unknowing corporate directors, on the theory that the wrongful
activity occurred as a result of the principal's failure to exercise
due care and attention to corporate affairs.24 7 Directors who are
primarily concerned about long term planning and company goal
setting, may never become aware that the product they recently
marketed had failed all its safety tests or for some other reason is
dangerously defective. Given the complexity of many corporate
bureaucracies, a director cannot possibly know of the day to day
details which surround the marketing of the company's prod-
ucts. 24 8 This expanded liability of directors has stopped many
able businessmen from accepting directorships in large compa-
nies. "[S]cores of men are politely declining offers they once
would have jumped at to serve on prestigious boards .... There
now is a real shortage of competent men willing and able to serve
as directors."249
Even within the narrow scope of this article (the conscious dis-
regard for human life resulting from an active effort to suppress
the dangers of consumer products and services), indirect implica-
tion of directors remains a concern. The Grush-Saunby report,
the Sumner Simpson file and the Kaylo documents discussed
above established that corporate knowledge extended far, yet
only to high level officers. And while the evidence indicates that
high level company officials were similarly aware of the perils at
Love Canal,250 in California water tables,25 ' and with Firestone's
246. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAw at 232.
247. C. STONE, supra note 80, at 59; see also United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), where the
court justified conviction of a corporation for an antitrust violation on grounds that
high management officials most likely participated in the violation or were at least
aware of it.
248. The point is supported by dicta in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188
A.2d 125, 41 Del. Ch. 78 (1963), where the court noted that it is not practicable for
the Board to consider in detail specific problems of the various divisions.
249. Gartner, Many Executives Reject Proffered Board Seats As Perils of Post
Mount, Wall St. J., March 13, 1969 at 1, col. 6; see also W. KNEPPER, LIABILrvy OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 590 (3rd ed. 1978), which speaks of the prob-
lem in the context of indemnity.
250. Residents at Niagra Falls, New York, were forced to evacuate their homes
due to the health hazards posed by toxic wastes which seeped out of the Hooker
Chemical Company's old dumping ground at Love Canal. Evidence gleaned from
Hooker's own company files revealed that the company had known of the dangers
of the toxic chemicals and that they were escaping from the ground several years
without warning the nearby residents. "Hooker's top management knowingly au-
thorized pollution violations and that the company fudged test results and hid
data from authorities." 125 CONG. REC. E5658 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of
Rep. Miller).
251. For years, Occidental Chemical Co. management was dumping pesticides
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500 radial tires, 2 5 2 nowhere is there evidence that extends culpa-
bility to the directors.
While there is validity to the claim that unknowing directors
might become implicated by the stigma of a criminal fine, it is
well to realize that an unsuspecting director usually will not suf-
fer personal economic harm in the capacity of a director. Often
fines assessed upon a corporation will be paid out of the corporate
coffers. 25 3
Yet the fact remains that corporations do not commit crimes-
people do,254 and thus it would seem to be more appropriate to
proceed directly against the individual perpetrator than the cor-
poration as a whole. 255 While holding the entire corporate body
criminally liable for acts of reckless disregard for human life
would be a dramatic improvement over present liability schemes,
punishment of the particular individual offenders by means of fre-
quently imposed jail sentences, would provide a better mecha-
nism for deterrence. As compared to monetary fines assessed
upon the corporation as a whole, even where the fine is correlated
in violation of California law but the company warned no one, nor did it cease its
practices. A company memo of June 18, 1958, noted the danger to children who
were playing in the area, yet local residents were not warned because "we did not
feel we could do it (notify them) without incurring a substantial legal liability for
current owners of the property." Moreover, company officials admitted to mislead-
ing California water board officials about the polluting activities. Id.
252. The ill-fated Firestone 500 steel-belted radial tire was, according to federal
authorities, prone to blowouts, tread separation, and other dangerous deformities
involving 41 deaths and 65 injuries. A Radical Radial Recall, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30,
1978, at 68.
While Firestone had no prior knowledge of the deformities of its tire, when it did
learn of the hazards, no warnings were issued nor was production curtailed. In
September 1973, one year after production of the tires commenced, Firestone's di-
rector of development, Thomas A. Robertson, sent a blunt assessment of 500 radi-
als to the company's top management. In that memo it was acknowledged, "we
are making an inferior quality radial tire which will subject us to belt-edge separa-
tion at high mileage." Forewarnings of Fatal Flaws, Time, June 25, 1979 at 58. De-
spite the memo, others like it, and an "epidemic" of auto accidents apparently
caused by the tire's failing, Firestone continued to sell nearly 24 million radials at
$50 each over the next five years while insisting the tire had no safety defects.
Only after being forced to do so by the federal government, did the company issue
a recall. Forewarnings of Fatal Flaws, Time, June 25, 1979 at 58.
253. Provisions for indemnification by the corporation of the director's liability
expenses exist within many, if not most, articles of incorporation, bylaws and
modern corporate statutes. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
431-32, 800-13 (2d ed. 1970).
254. Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary? 29 Sw. L.J.
908, 924 (1975).
255. Id. at 924.
to the amount of economic wrongdoing, corporations will eventu-
ally pass the costs on to consumers,256 thereby minimizing any
deterrent impact there would have been otherwise. Additionally,
concerns for the "innocent" shareholders would be removed.
Of major concern with the individual liability approach is the
difficulty in identifying the guilty party.257 At common law, this
was not such a problem given the corporation's limited size and
complexity, and hence, courts found no reason to subject the cor-
poration to liability.25 8 Today the corporate diversity and com-
plexity259 has necessitated the expansion of corporate liability to
the point where a court has held a corporation guilty of man-
slaughter.260 There is even scholarly support for the concept of
corporate murder.261
Yet even when the particular wrongdoers cannot be ascer-
tained, there remains justification for criminal corporate liability
as opposed to individual liability, which stems from the effects of
the organization on individual behavior. Consider the following:
What prevents most of us from committing murder is not a calculation
based upon the threat of what the law will do, but mechanisms-guilt,
shame, anxiety, conscience, superego-internalized within us through the
forces of family, school, church, and peer group. When individuals are
placed in an organizational structure, some of the ordinary internalized
restraints seem to lose their hold.
2 6 2
The economic pressures which ferment within the corporate
structure are sometimes strong enough to cause employees to
risk their own liability for the sake of corporate gain.263 "[I] f the
penalty for corporate wrongdoing were punishment of the corpo-
ration the punishment would ipso facto fall upon the true logical
wrongdoer.264
The practical and conceptual considerations involved in crimi-
nal corporate liability mandate that expansion of corporate liabil-
ity must be carefully defined to protect the common goals of
256. Id. at 927.
257. Id. at 922.
258. Id.
259. C. Stone, supra note 80, at 2.
260. See notes 190-237 supra and accompanying text.
261. Mueller, supra note 124, at 21.
Why should not a corporation be guilty of murder where, for instance, a
corporate resolution sends the corporation's workmen to a dangerous
place of work without protection, all officers secreting from these work-
men the fact that even a brief exposure to the particular work hazards will
be fatal, as was the case in the notorious Hawk's Nest venture in West
Virginia, where wholesale death was attributable to silicosis?
Id. at 23.
262. C. Stone, supra note 80, at 35.
263. Id.
264. Richberg, The Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations, XIX THE GREEN
BAG 156 (1907).
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public health and safety.265
In cases of corporations that consciously and recklessly subject
their own customers and employees to death for the purpose of
monetary gain, the interests of practicality and public policy war-
rant the extension of corporate criminal liability. If public policy
demands have been deemed great enough to warrant criminal lia-
bility being extended to corporate acts of larceny and false pre-
tenses, they are great enough to extend liability to corporate
homicide.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Today, it is not a crime for high-level corporate officers or direc-
tors to consciously conceal a workplace hazard or to market an
unsafe product.266 The corporate malefactor who falsifies test re-
sults or reports to government agencies, suppresses damage infor-
mation, and misrepresents the safety value of a product, at time
receives little more than a slap on its metaphorical wrist.267
Those who oppose the concept of corporate homicide argue that
there is no need to make this kind of behavior criminal because
corporations are capable of regulating their own conduct through
internal company mechanisms; 268 but new discoveries of corpo-
265. The only serious harm which it [the corporation] can do, consists in
the injury to those really innocent stockholders who having nothing to do
with the crime and no real opportunity of preventing it. This injury is re-
grettable; but... the balance of advantage seems to require subordinat-
ing their interest to the general interest. However 'innocent' the owners
of the corporate enterprise may be, the general interest requires that...
corporate responsibility can deter them, from conducting the business in
criminal ways.
Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 836-37 (1927).
266. Only civil remedies are available, as discussed in text accompanying notes
126-67 supra.
267. The testing and marketing conduct of Richardson-Merrell in its endeavors
to get the Federal Drug Administration's approval to market the drug MER/29, is a
prime example. While the court noted the extreme abhorrence of the behavior, its
award of $500,000 can arguably be considered relatively slight, given the size and
profitability of the drug company. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App.
2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); see also R. FINE, THE GREAT DRUG DEcEPrION: THE
SHOCKING STORY OF MER/29 AND THE FoLKs WHO GAVE You THALIDOMIDE 25
(1972). On other occasions the wrist slap is more harsh, as was the case of Grim-
shaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761 (Orange County Superior Court, filed Nov. 22,
1972).
268. This line of reasoning holds to the idea that conduct of individual employ-
ees are closely monitored by company supervisors. Since "careless" employees
are of greater cost to the company than benefit, it is cost efficient for corporations
to regulate their own internal processes. The underlying premise is that corpora-
rate disregard for human life continue to be found, rendering the
argument's merit questionable. 269 Recent developments indicate
that such conduct is not an isolated nor temporary phenomenon;
such developments have evoked congressional concern.270
Corrective measures have sprouted as a result, including the
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979271 which contains some unique
transformations, that, if adopted, 272 could have a profound impact
upon the business community. Before addressing some of the
more unique aspects of the legislation, of initial interest is the
bill's treatment of homicide. Unfortunately, the Act does little to
illuminate the semantic confusion surrounding the definition of
homicide. Section 1603,273 dealing with negligent homicide defines
the offense as follows: "A person is guilty of an offense if he en-
gages in conduct by which he negligently causes the death of an-
other person."274 While the definition of "person" under the bill's
general definition appears to include corporations 275 at least by
tions will replace the careless employee with another who is not so careless leav-
ing each worker with the choice of exercising an optimum degree of care or lose
his job. Liebowitz, Does the Corporation Discourage Individual Responsibility?,
THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 11 (M. Bruce Johnson ed. 1978).
269. Current controversy centers around A.H. Robins Co. for having marketed a
poorly designed intrauterine birth-control device under the trade name of Dalcon
Shield. WASHINGTON POST, June 17, 1980 reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. E3123 (daily
ed. June 20, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Miller). A Colorado court awarded $6.8 million
in the case after it found that "evidence showed that once the company was made
specifically aware of the numerous dangerous side effects of the device . . . it sup-
pressed the information, made additional false claims, and then resorted to an ef-
fort to coverup the facts." Id. at E3124.
The other recent discovery again involves the Ford Motor Company, for a design
flaw in the automatic transmissions of several cars produced in the early 1970's.
The allegations claimed that the cars suddenly, without warning, would slip from
neutral to reverse resulting in 98 deaths, 1,710 injuries and as many as 23,000 con-
sumer complaints. As early as June 30, 1971, a Ford memo from Ford's principal
engineer for chassis safety systems, D.R. Dixon, is said to have warned company
officials of the problem and recommended a new design. Yet the cars continued to
be marketed in their unaltered condition up to October 1979, well after Dixon's al-
leged warnings to Ford officials. Id. at E3123-24.
270. See notes 271-72, 293 infra and accompanying text.
271. For information on the new Federal Criminal Code, see Senate bill. S. 1722,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101, 125 CONG. REc. 11090 (1979) and Hearings on S. 1722 and
S. 1723 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979
(hereinafter cited as Judiciary Hearings); K. Feinberg, Proposed Code: Order,
Consistency Replace Loopholes, Archaic Laws, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 4, 1980 at 48, col. 1;
N. Feinberg, Biggest Proposed Changes Affect Sentencing & White-Collar Crime,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 11, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
272. J. Mann, Crime Code Reform Mired in Complexity, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1980,
Part I, at 1, col. 1.
273. Senate bill S 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1603(a), 125 CONG. REC. 11179
(1979) has been passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee and is presently await-
ing Senate floor action.
274. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1603(a), 125 CONG. REC. 11179 (1979).
275. Id. at § 111: "'person' means (a) an individual; or (b) except when used to
refer to the victim of an offense involving death or bodily injury, an organization."
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inference, the crime itself is unlikely to encompass the reckless
corporate disregard envisioned by this article. As defined, the
crime entails "negligently" induced deaths, which is a culpability
standard below the knowing awareness of Ford Motor Company
and the asbestos manufacturers.
Of greater intrigue is section 1617 of the Act, which sets forth a
new crime of criminal endangerment, 276 in an attempt to reach
knowing life-endangering conduct at issue here.
(a) OFFENSE-A person is guilty of an offense if he engages in conduct
that he knows places another person in imminent danger of death or seri-
ous bodily injury, and-
(1) his conduct in the circumstances manifests an extreme indiffer-
ence to human life; or
(2) his conduct in the circumstances manifests an unjustified disre-
gard of human life.2 7 7
While precisely addressing the conduct under discussion here, its
applicability to corporations is questionable. If "persons" is de-
fined as including organizations "except when used to refer to the
victim of an offense involving death or bodily injury," corporate
structures would necessarily be included. Here, the offense must
be expressly designated by statute,278 and imminent danger must
arise out of conduct under carefully delineated federal statutes. 279
As for criminal sanctions, the new Federal Criminal Code pro-
vides several, including criminal fines. Section 2201 of the Act in-
creases fines for felonies to one million dollars for organizations
276. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1617, 125 CONG. REC. 11182 (1979).
277. Id. This amended version includes the phrase "imminent danger of
death." This expands the scope of the earlier version that was limited to acts
which placed another in danger of "imminent death." Under the former version,
the "imminent death" standard would have precluded liability for conduct which
caused delayed injuries or death due to long latency periods, such as with the as-
bestos workers.
278. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1617 (c)(1) (1979). The Pinto fiasco was not
prohibited by statute, meaning similar future conduct would be outside the juris-
dictional parameters of the criminal endangerment offense.
279. Id. at § 1617(c)(3).
(A) section 1853 (Environmental Pollution);
(B) section 110(d) of the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 (30
U.S.C. 820(d));
(C) section 17(e) of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (29
U.S.C. 666(e));
(D) section 5(a) of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 U.S.C.
1264(a));
(E) section 351(f) and 353(h) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
262(f) and 263a(h)); or
(F) section 303 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
333).
and $250,000 for individuals. 280 While increased fine levels would
appear to enhance deterrence of corporate irresponsibility, so
long as fine levels are not correlated to the amount of wrongful
gain, the deterrent value would probably be modest.281 For penal-
ties to be effective, the cost of engaging in the harmful activity
must exceed the benefits which stem from it.282
Assume for a moment that Ford Motor Company had not yet
marketed the Pinto but was contemplating doing so. Ford had es-
timated there would be a cost of $137 million to redesign the Pinto
to make it as safe as other cars on the market. They also esti-
mated that by delaying the redesign for two years, there would re-
sult a fifty million dollar cost in terms of personal injury litigation
and damage claims.283 It takes but a simple calculation to see
that Ford could realize a net economic benefit of eighty-seven mil-
lion dollars if the company does not redesign the Pinto. Faced
with a penalty of one million dollars in criminal fines, should they
get caught, the costs of engaging in such conduct pales in compar-
ison to the economic benefits that can be acquired by marketing
the unsafe product.284 When good conduct is no longer economi-
cally advantageous, even fines as high as one million dollars can
result in minimum impact.285 So long as fine levels are not corre-
lated to the defendant's monetary gain, reckless disregard for
human life will continue to be economically appealing.286
A second criminal sanction provided by Senate bill 1722 is that
280. Id. at § 2201(b) (1) (A) (individual defendants) and § 2201 (b) (2) (A) (orga-
nizational defendants). Section 2202(e) precludes corporate defendants from
idemnifying their losses by providing that "the fine shall not be paid, directly or
indirectly, out of the assets of the organization."
281. When the fine is not correlated to the amount of economic gain derived
from the wrongful act, even as much as $400,000 - 500,000 in fines can have nominal
impact. For example, it has been written that the effect of the $437,500 fine levied
on General Electric for its part in the electrical equipment price-fixing conspircy,
which affected some seven billion dollars of commerce was roughly equivalent to a
$3.00 parking fine for a man with an income of $15,000 a year. M. GREEN, THE
CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 170 (1972).
282. See note 286 infra and accompanying text.
283. These figures were those included in the Grush-Saunby report discussed
in text accompanying note 33 supra. The fifty million dollar figure is a mere
"rounded off" version of the $49.5 million figure used by Ford.
284. When dealing with major American corporations, present fine levels do not
reflect consideration of the enormous figures involved in various business activity.
For instance, company sales for the Ford Mustang during the first 27 months alone
may have netted $350 million, MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS
10025-26 (1974), while Ford lost an estimated $250 million on the Edsel. Smith,
How a Great Corporation Got Out of Control: The Story of General Dynamics,
FORTUNE, Jan. 1962, at 64.
285. See C. STONE, supra note 80, at 37-38.
286. One executive candidly testified: "It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to
control flourides." Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.
1963).
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of imprisonment of company officials as a means of deterring illig-
itimate business behavior. By its nature it cannot be imposed
upon a corporation, but following a corporate conviction the indi-
vidual perpetrator could certainly serve the sentence as agent for
the corporate wrongdoing.287
The deterrent value of imprisonment appears to be especially
effective as applied to businessmen. It has been shown that peo-
ple such as businessmen, who place a high value on their commu-
nity standing are likely to be particularly sensitive to the stigma
associated with a criminal conviction.288 Where conviction is cou-
pled with imprisonment the stigma becomes even greater. "To
the businessman ... prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-
reward analysis breaks down when the risk is jail.2 8 9 It has fur-
ther been found that the "threat of a jail sentence in particular in-
duces employees to forego even substantial corporate profits
rather than risk individual criminal liability."29 0
Perhaps the greatest impact of jail sentences would be to intro-
duce a new variable in the corporate cost-benefit analysis equa-
tion. No longer would a company be able to predict the number
of lawsuits which might arise and the anticipated amount of fines
incurred and plug the figure into the cost variable. Imprisonment
of businessmen is not precedent setting in any way-it is only a
287. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403, 92 CONG. REC. 11122 (1979). Section 403
provides: "a person is criminally liable for an offense based upon conduct that he
engages in or causes in the name of an organization or on behalf of an organiza-
tion to the same extent as if he engaged in or caused the conduct in his own name
or on his own behalf."
288. H. PACKER, THE Lirrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356 (1968).
289. Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J., 630, 630-31
(1977).
290. Comment, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1245 (1979). The case of the 1961 Gen-
eral Electric price-fixing conspiracy lends credence to the idea of jail sentences de-
terring business misconduct. Of the seven businessmen who received jail
sentences, four were corporate vice-presidents, two division managers, and one
was a sales manager. During trial the men testified that price-fixing was "a way of
life." Following their convictions and jail sentences, however, their attitudes ap-
peared to dramatically change. Before a Senate Subcommittee, one witness testi-
fied: "They would never get me to do it again. I would starve before I would do it
again." Another man was asked whether he would resume the price-fixing meet-
ings if told to do so by his superiors replied; "I would leave the company rather
than participate in the meetings again." One former vice-president stated that the
"taint of a jail sentence" made people "start looking at moral values a little bit."
G. Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRim. L. BULL. 377 (1972)
citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary at 16790.
sanction that is seldom invoked.291
The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, while meritorious in the
sense of labeling acts of reckless endangerment as criminal, has
the effect of contributing to the burgeoning federal regulatory mo-
rass that many businessmen feel is unnecessarily intrusive. 292 If
such government intrusion is to be reduced, the goal should be to
encourage industrial self-regulation.
A second legislative proposal pending within the halls of Con-
gress appears to make just such an attempt. House bill 7043293
sponsored by Representative George Miller (D-Cal.) would estab-
lish criminal penalties for certain corporate officials who know-
ingly suppress the hazards of their product from employees or the
public.294 As with the Federal Criminal Code Reform Act, the lia-
bility focus of H.R. 7040 is not with corporate criminal liability but
rather individual liability, and in that sense appears outside the
scope of a corporate homicide discussion. The bill, however, rec-
ognizes the severity of this particular form of business conduct
and attempts to deter it, not only by attaching a criminal stigma
to the act, but by encouraging industrial self-regulation. 295
As the Pinto and the asbestos episodes suggest, the reckless
disregard for human life usually entails active attempts to sup-
press knowledge of product hazards. This suppression of evi-
dence within a complex organizational structure makes
wrongdoing doubly difficult to detect. This bill, however, penal-
izes the suppression of the dangerous defect as opposed to penal-
izing consequences of the defect itself. Specifically, the legislature
requires that once a corporate manager 296 discovers that a poten-
tial serious health or safety hazard exists in a product, the man-
ager must notify all affected employees and regulatory agencies
who in turn can notify the public.297 Compliance requires nothing
more than a postcard notice.298 Thus, the corporate agent, under
291. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
292. Mofsky, Are State Securities Laws (Blue Sky Regulations) Beneficial or
Harmful? THE ArrACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 127-28 (M. Bruce Johnson ed.
1978).
293. The bill was originally introduced as H.R. 4973 on July 26, 1979 but has
since been reintroduced as a clean bill currently pending in the Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Crime.
294. H.R. 7040, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
295. See 125 CONG. REC. E5656 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
296. "(d) As used in this section
(1) the term 'manager' means a person having -
(A) management authority in or as a business entity; and
(B) significant responsibility for the safety of a product or
business practice or for the conduct of research or testing in connection
with a product or business practice."
297. CONG. REc. E3123 (daily ed. June 20, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
298. Id.
IVol. 8: 367, 19811 Corporate Homicide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
this bill, has incentive not to suppress such information.
At least within some quarters of the corporate sector, the con-
cept, generally referred to as "whistleblowing,"299 has evoked
"sound damnation." 300 The argument is that a breach of loyalty to
the company occurs when a worker "turns in" his companions
and subjects his employer to civil and, perhaps, criminal penal-
ties. In the words of former General Motors chairman, James M.
Roche, "[SIome of the enemies of business now encourage an
employee to be disloyal to the enterprise .... However this is la-
beled-industrial espionage, whistle-blowing or professional re-
sponsibility-it is another tactic for spreading disunity and
creating conflict." 30 1 If self-regulation is to be encouraged, special
protections, which are few, need to be afforded the whistle-
blower. H.R. 7040 provides that protection in section 1822(b).
Whoever knowingly discriminates against any person in the terms or con-
ditions of employment or in retention in employment or in hiring because
of such person's having informed a Federal agency or warned employees
of a serious concealed danger associated with a product or business prac-
tice shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both. 3
0 2
This type of supervision contains an obvious drawback difficult to
circumvent. While the law might prevent whistleblowers from be-
ing fired, it cannot prevent the company from making his life un-
comfortable. Section 1822(b) attempts to rectify the situation by
penalizing discriminatory conduct, but in reality, there are diffi-
cult causation problems in trying to prove that subtle forms of
harrassment are the result of the whistleblowing.3O3
Though neither piece of legislation, House bill 7040 nor Senate
bill 1722 provides for criminal corporate liability for homicide, the
attempts are nevertheless commendable in their congressional
cognizance of a long neglected mode of reprehensible conduct
which arguably necessitates a criminal label. Moreover, if legisla-
tive developments follow the historical path of the common law,
then these attempts to expand individual criminal liability may
be indicative of an emerging trend to hold the corporate body it-
299. See C. STONE supra note 80, at 213-16.
300. Id. at 214.
301. The Whistle Blowers, TnmE, April 17, 1972, at 85. Concern for disloyalty of
whistleblowers, however, appears misplaced since it ignores the fact that they
would not be necessary, absent serious concealment of product dangers.
302. H.R. 7040, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1822 (d) (1) (A) (B), 126 CONG. REC. E1774
(daily ed. April 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
303. See C. STONE supra note 80, at 215.
self criminally liable for acts of reckless disregard for human life
in the products field.
VII. EPILOGUE
Our judicial system labels acts that are particularly offensive
and repugnant to our sense of right and wrong as criminal. This
labeling process has a two-pronged effect. First, it generally in-
vokes more severe penalties as a means of deterring the offensive
behavior, and secondly, a criminal charge attaches a stigma upon
the convicted person or group which serves as an advertisement
to all that this form of behavior will not be tolerated. Today, this
stigma has not been placed on corporations who knowingly mar-
ket life-endangering products, but as both primary and secondary
authorities continue to carve out more and more exceptions to
criminal corporate liability, it appears the courts are now at the
brink of extending the analysis to acts of corporate homicide.
However courts are limited to interpreting the statutory language
given them by the various state legislatures. Real reform must
therefore come from the legislative branches to modify statutory
definitions of "person" to encompass the corporate body. The "ju-
ristic" person must be held accountable along with its homo
sapien counterpart in those cases where there is: (1) a calculated
and deliberate failure to correct a life-threatening product without
warning those persons subjected to the danger, and (2) an active
suppression or attempt to suppress such information of a prod-
uct's dangerous defect.
Under present law, if an individual makes a conscious decision
to act so as to subject others to a substantial certainty of death, it
is considered a homicidal act unless that person does so while
employed by and acting on behalf of a corporation. It is time to
judicially and legislatively recognize that the result is the same in
either case, whether the actor is a corporate agent or a common
street criminal, or whether the murder weapon is a dangerously
designed fuel tank or a loaded pistol. The stark realities of "artifi-
cial beings" and "legal fictions" is that their impact is far from ar-
tificial or fictional.
The spector of the crumpled, ash-blackened 1973 Pinto strewn
along the side of U.S. Highway 33, brought forth the ugly side of
the profit motive, a motive which at times makes human life little
more than another factor in the economic analysis of business.
While this will likely continue, the human element needs to be
made a more substantial factor than it is presently. If this at-
tempt is to accomplish anything more than a quixotic chasing of
windmills, jurists and legislators alike must recognize this reck-
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less disregard for human life for what it really is-the crime of
corporate homicide.
DOUGLAS S. ANDERSON

